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Abstract
This dissertation presents three studies related to labor productivity, re-
mittances use, and the effect of an anti-poverty program on migration and
remittances. Labor is the biggest endowment available to the poor. Un-
derstanding labor issues is important in addressing the problems of poverty,
inequality, migration, and economic development. In this dissertation, I es-
timate the labor productivity of agricultural household because most of the
agricultural households in developing countries work in their own farms, it is
not possible to observe wages.
The first chapter estimates the shadow wage (marginal productivity of la-
bor) of the agricultural household in the context of Nepal. How different
is marginal productivity of labor for women compared to men in agricul-
tural households? In developing countries, where most of the families work
on their farms, wage or labor-related income cannot be observed directly.
This paper contributes to the literature on gender wage difference in labor
and development economics by developing a new approach to estimate the
shadow wage of agricultural households in Nepal. Using a general functional
form, we first derive the shadow wage from a theoretical model. Then, a
model with ward-level fixed effects is used to estimate the shadow wage by
gender for Nepalese agricultural households. We find that the productivity
of women is not that different than that of men. Despite the vast difference
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in observed market wages for women, the distribution of shadow wages of
women is not that different from that of men, calling for policies to increase
the market wages for women.
The second chapter of this dissertation, attempts to understand the use
of remittances among the households of Nepal. Remittances are transfers
made by migrant workers to their family and relatives in their country of
origin. In Nepal, remittances account for 25-30% of the GDP, and the trend
of youths seeking work in other countries– mostly in Southeast Asia and the
Middle East– has been increasing. Understanding the expenditure pattern
of remittances-receiving households compared to non-recipients provides an
understanding of the effect of remittances. In this chapter I employ nation-
ally representative data from Nepal to investigate the effect of remittances
on household expenditure patterns, and I compare the prevalence of poverty
between remittance recipients and non-recipients. The findings that emerge
are as follows: households receiving international and both domestic and
international remittances have increased expenditure shares on education,
suggesting investments in human capital in the household. In contrast I find
a decrease in education expenditures for households receiving domestic re-
mittances. Food expenditures share decreases for households receiving all
types of remittances. Households receiving remittances increase the expen-
diture shares on durables and other consumption expenditures. Households
receiving remittances have decreased shares in health expenditures. With
regards to poverty, the paper shows that receiving remittances reduces the
likelihood of being poor.
In the third chapter of the dissertation, I evaluate the effects of the Poverty
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Alleviation Fund program (PAF) on remittances and migration using the
data from a quasi-experiment. The PAF is a social fund program that has
been providing services to marginalized communities in Nepal through var-
ious income-generating activities since 2006. Unlike previous research that
has used conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) to study the role of a
development program on migration and remittances, I employ the data from
the community-driven anti-poverty program that provides income-generating
activities to participants. Using a panel dataset collected by Center for Eco-
nomic Development and Administration (CEDA) of the Tribhuwan Univer-
sity and the PAF, and taking advantage of a quasi-randomized phase-in ex-
perimental design, I estimate the causal effects of a development program
on remittances, migration, and welfare measures. I show that policy makers
should be aware that community-driven development programs have unin-
tended consequences for migration and remittances, which are distinct from
the primary goals of the program: alleviating poverty and improving food se-
curity. The program results in a decrease of approximately Rs.6000 (approx-
imately six percent of total household consumption) in remittances received,
crowding out private transfers in the presence of public transfers. The pa-
per shows an increase in domestic migration, but no change in international
migration due to the program.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Agriculture plays a crucial role in the non-industrial economy. The agri-
cultural sector not only provides food to the country but also acts as the
reservoir of the semi-skilled and unskilled labor in the economy. The agri-
cultural sector in developing countries is mostly subsistence, labor intensive,
small scale, and low skilled. In most of the cases, perfectly functioning la-
bor markets are absent. Hence, the productivity of subsistence households is
hard to measure. The measurement of productivity can provide insights for
the difference in agricultural productivity across households by gender and
region, which is essential to implement appropriate policy interventions for
economic development.
The setting of my dissertation is Nepal, where the majority of employment
is in the agricultural sector. The young unskilled and semi-skilled labor force
do not have domestic opportunities outside the agricultural sector to trade
their labor. In my dissertation, I address issues that are essential for the
economic development of Nepal. Nepal is an agricultural economy. Accord-
ing to the Ministry of Agriculture of Nepal (2013), agriculture provides em-
ployment to about 66 percent of the population and contributes 33 percent
of GDP. Agriculture in Nepal is performed mostly at the subsistence level,
i.e., farmers produce as well as consume most of the products within their
household. Individuals in developing countries increasingly want to move
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away from agriculture, which is also the case in Nepal. In the absence of a
domestic manufacturing sector to absorb the excess labor from subsistence
agriculture, surplus labor can look for opportunities internationally that can
provide better income sources than working on farms. In Nepal, youths
between the ages of 15-49 are increasingly likely to migrate in search of op-
portunities abroad. I analyze the effect of remittances sent by migrants on
household consumption and poverty incidence in Nepal. I also utilize data
from an anti-poverty program to understand how creating local opportunities
through local income-generating opportunities, can affect the migration and
remittances for households.
In Chapter 2, I propose a new estimation approach to quantify the produc-
tivity of agricultural households by gender. Using the utility maximization
of agricultural households, I first solve for the marginal productivity of la-
bor by gender, which is a function of data and parameters. Then, using
the data from the Nepal Living Standard Survey 2010 (NLSS3) I empirically
estimate the shadow wages of males and females in the household, which is
the marginal productivity of self-employed labor. I find that even though the
shadow wages for men and women are not that different, we see the market
wages for women tend to be much lower than men. The results from this
paper suggest a need for direct intervention to increase wages for women
recognizing their productivity.
In Chapter 3, I explore how households receiving remittances are differ-
ent from households not receiving remittances. Using expenditure data on
food, apparel, durables, home improvement, education, and health from the
NLSS3, I analyze how households differ in expenditure shares. I also in-
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vestigate the role of remittances on poverty incidence to see if remittances
have any effect on the poverty status of households in Nepal. I find that
remittance-receiving households spend more on durables and other consump-
tion goods. The share of educational expenditures increases for households
receiving international and both(domestic and international) remittances,
suggesting an increase in human capital investment. Additionally, I find
that households receiving remittances have a lower likelihood of being poor.
In Chapter 4, I apply impact evaluation techniques to understand the effect
of an anti-poverty program on remittances and migration using data from
the Nepal Poverty Alleviation Fund Program. The relationship I explore in
the chapter the effect of increased income-generating activities on migration
and remittances in poor communities in Nepal. The working hypothesis in
this chapter is if the lack of local opportunities motivates migration, then
the creation of local opportunities should have an effect on migration and
remittances. The data from the program provides an ideal setup to under-
stand the role of local opportunities on migration and remittances. I find
that the program slows migration and crowds out private transfers from the
migrants. To support the argument, I estimate the effect of the program on
welfare measures of the households receiving the program. I find an increase
in welfare measures that can be attributed to the program. The chapter
concludes that the increase in migration can be attributed to a lack of op-
portunities locally, giving Nepali individuals little choice but to choose the
route of international migration, which tends to provide substantially larger
payoffs than opportunities available locally for low skilled labor.
The questions I study in my dissertation are some of the major challenges
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for developing countries around the world. Even though I only use data from
Nepal, the presence of imperfect labor markets and self-employed individu-
als on their own farms is a common issue in developing countries. The labor
productivity for individuals working on their own farms is hard to measure
for a major proportion of the workforce in these economies. The ability to
measure the productivity of individuals on their own farms provides a tool to
understand the effect of programs that are implemented to increase the agri-
cultural productivity of individuals in such settings. The issue of migration
is another major challenge facing developing economies around the world.
The inability of manufacturing and construction sectors to absorb the sur-
plus semi-skilled or unskilled labor from the agricultural sector in developing
countries will create pressure on available resources creating a push factor
for migration to areas within or beyond ones national boundary.
The question of the effect of remittances on household consumption and
investment decisions in labor-sending settings becomes necessary to analyze
as socio-economic consequences are associated with migration and transfers.
Migration is going to be important in the years to come as individuals from
poorer countries would like to migrate due to the lack of opportunities. Re-
gions where migration is common face competition for limited resources to
create economic opportunities for a large share of the population. The lack
of opportunities in migrant-sending countries can encourage migration and
put pressure on migrant-receiving countries leading to social tensions and
lack of harmony. One of the potential solutions can be coordination between
the migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries to create opportunities
for individuals in migrant-sending countries. It would be interesting to un-
derstand the effect of local economic opportunities on migration to address
4
the issue of migration.
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CHAPTER 2
ESTIMATION OF THE SHADOW WAGES
IN AN AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLD
MODEL IN NEPAL
2.1 Introduction
This paper proposes a new estimation approach to calculating the marginal
productivity of labor by gender for agricultural households. Agriculture plays
a significant role in developing economies in part because a significant por-
tion of the workforce is self-employed in it. Most agricultural households
work on their own farms, practicing subsistence agriculture. The dominance
of self-employment in the absence of observable wages from the labor mar-
kets poses difficulties for policy analysis related to agricultural households,
as the marginal productivity of labor becomes difficult to measure. For self-
employed individuals, the shadow wage, or opportunity cost of time, is de-
termined by household production. The shadow wage is equal to the market
wage in a functioning labor market, and it can be estimated in the absence of
functioning labor markets (when the separability hypothesis fails) (Jacoby,
1993; Skoufias, 1994).1 It is derived from the first-order condition of the
agricultural household’s utility maximization problem after profit has been
incorporated into the budget constraint. The estimation of shadow wages
can help facilitate understanding the contribution of household members to
household production when individuals do not participate in formal labor
1We have performed a test for separability following Le (2010) and rejected the sepa-
rability hypothesis. The separability results are available upon request.
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markets.
In developing countries, women’s participation in agriculture is common.
Gender plays a significant role in agricultural labor markets of developing
countries. A persistent gender wage gap exists in both developing and devel-
oped countries. Wages for women are 60-75% of men’s wages for similar types
of jobs in developed countries. A major reason for the wage gap can be either
biological or social factors (Aly and Shields, 2010). In developing countries
where women participate in non-formal labor markets, it is harder to measure
the disparity of wages compared to developed countries. Bardhan and Udry
(1999) point out that gender differences in wages and occupational segmen-
tation of women can lead to different labor market conditions, especially for
women. Women in developing countries are usually restricted to traditional
gender roles due to socio-cultural factors and the absence of functioning la-
bor markets. Thus, the contribution of women could be underestimated. In
a patriarchal society such as Nepal, wages and jobs may be gender-specific.
Men and women internalize these standards and help perpetuate disparities.
The ability to measure productivity by gender is necessary to understand the
contribution of both men and women to reduce these disparities.
In Nepal, where men and women carry traditional gender roles, failing to
account for household output can lead to an underestimation of the role of
women in household productivity. Women supply more hours in household
work such as cooking, fetching water, child care among other household tasks.
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of hours supplied by men and women in
household work in Nepalese agricultural households. In addition, women in
agricultural households, who are both producers and consumers, also supply
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a similar amount of labor on their farm as shown in Figure 2.2. The estima-
tion of shadow wages helps us analyze the productivity of individuals, which
can help understand gender productivity gaps in the production process of
agricultural households. This paper contributes to the estimation of shadow
wages in Nepalese agricultural households by applying the semi-parametric
production function introduced by Le (2009). We estimate the structural
parameters of agricultural household labor supply from estimated reduced
form equations using the classical minimum distance estimation approach.
Previous works by Jacoby (1993), Skoufias (1994), Abdulai and Regmi
(2000), Carter and Yao (2002), Le (2009), and Barrett, Sherlund, and Adesina
(2008) are a few examples that have estimated shadow wages. Barrett, Sher-
lund, and Adesina (2008) estimate structural household labor supply mod-
els in the presence of unobservable wages and possible deviation(s) in the
marginal revenue product of self-labor from their shadow wage. The method
proposed by Le (2009) uses a flexible functional form without having to esti-
mate a production function. We identify the shadow wage of men and women
in Nepalese agricultural households using a structural model that incorpo-
rates the models in Jacoby (1993). Jacoby (1993) uses a pair of labor supply
equations along with a specific functional form to estimate the shadow wage.
He uses instruments to estimate correctly the production function (Cobb-
Douglas and translog) to avoid bias in estimated marginal productivity. The
model in our paper uses a semi-parametric production function used in Le
(2009). A semi-parametric functional form is a novel approach as it relaxes
specific functional forms such as Cobb-Douglas, translog or log-linear. In-
stead, it uses a more general functional structure to derive the shadow wage.
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Unlike Jacoby, who uses instrumental variables, we obtain consistent esti-
mates of reduced form parameters by including ward fixed effects to control
for community level unobserved variables that influence the shadow wage.
We also employ household-specific proxy variables to control for the effects of
household unobserved variables (Benjamin, 1992). We improve the Le (2009)
empirical approach to estimate the structural parameters without having to
use an iterative procedure that requires arbitrary selection of starting values.
The consistent reduced form estimates are then used to recover estimates of
the structural parameters using minimum distance estimation (Rothenberg,
1973). Estimates of shadow wages (in Table 2.6) along with kernel density
plot in Figure 2.4 show the distribution of shadow wages of women is not
much different than the distribution of shadow wages of men as compared to
market wage for men and women. These differences provide evidence that
female productivity difference is less than the wage differences prevalent in
the labor market. Hence, policies geared towards equal wages for women
should be supported.
We make three major contributions to the literature. (1) We improve the
empirical model to estimate the marginal productivity of labor in agricultural
households using a structural model of labor supply. Structural modeling at-
tempts to use data to identify the parameters of an underlying economic
model, which is based on a model of relations among the variables. (2) We
develop a simple model to understand the contribution of household members
in the production process and provide evidence that the marginal produc-
tivity of females are not lower compared to that of their male counterparts.
(3) We find that when labor supplied by individuals constitutes the total of
own farm work, household work, and market work, an increase in shadow
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wages may not increase the labor supply because of time constraints faced
by individuals. The previous literature shows that an increase in market
wages has a positive effect on off-farm labor supplied but the inclusion of
household work and own farm work is not included in such analyses. Sim-
ilarly with regards to shadow income, which include unearned income plus
the value of home production, farm profits, and income from wage labor, an
increase in shadow income could decrease leisure. Our results suggest the
presence of structural discrimination hence, policies geared toward reducing
these structural discrimination is required.
2.2 Theoretical Model
The theoretical framework in this paper is based on a standard time-
allocation model. A farm household maximizes a joint utility function de-
fined over leisure (l), consumption (C) and a vector of preference shifters
(A-demographic variables, m- males, f -females). Households maximize their
utility function subject to the budget constraints, which includes income from
agricultural production, wage earned on labor, and unearned income. We as-
sume the factor markets for agricultural inputs are imperfect but functioning.
We assume that household labor is substitutable by hired labor. We assume
male and female labor are substitutable for household and farm works. The
households can work as many hours as they want on their farms. Therefore,
the agricultural household solves the following maximization problem:
max
C,lm,lf
U(C, lm, lf ;A) (2.1)
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s.t. Full Income Budget Constraint (FIBC):
C + lfw
∗
f + lmw
∗
m = Π + Y + wmMm + wfMf + V (Nm, Nf ; J). (2.2)
where,
Π = pQ(Lm, Lf , z;F )− pzz. (2.3)
Total Time Available and Labor Supplied:
Ti = hi + li & hi = Li +Mi +Ni. (2.4)
where, U(.) and Q(.) are quasi-concave utility and concave farm production
functions respectively. One of the working assumptions is that men and
women have equal access to all the production technology available to the
household. C is goods consumed either purchased in the market (c) or pro-
duced at home (v), i.e. C = c + v. Π is the profit from farm production; Y
is the unearned income of the household. p is the price of farm output; wm
and wf are the male and female market wages; pz is the price of farm input
z; Mm and Mf are time spent in the labor market by men and women; hi is
the total labor supplied by individual i; Li is the labor supplied to own farm
by individual i; Mi is the labor supplied to the market; and Ni is the labor
supplied to household production. F is quasi-fixed inputs such as land and
machinery. V (Nm, Nf ; J) is the household production function with J being
inputs such as electricity and refrigerators. Solving the utility maximization
problem in equation 2.1 using constraints in equations 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4, the
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shadow wage is derived. The theoretical model is connected to the empirical
model using shadow income and shadow wage which are derived using the
semi-parametric production function in the utility maximization problem as
the household members are both producers and consumers of produced agri-
cultural products. The solution to this utility maximization problem gives us
the optimal household labor supply function hi = hi(w
∗
m, w
∗
f , y
∗;A). w∗m, w
∗
f ,
and y∗ are optimal shadow wages for men and women and shadow income.
2.3 Empirical Model
2.3.1 Estimation of the Shadow Wage and Shadow Income
Skoufias (1994) and Jacoby (1993) point out the shadow wage can be es-
timated even if the labor market is imperfect, as the shadow wage is the
marginal productivity of labor (MPL) at the optimal point on the produc-
tion function. To determine the MPL, we define a semi-parametric produc-
tion function, Q¯ = LλLf(z, F, σ), where f(.) is a non-parametric function,
z includes all the inputs, F is the quasi-fixed input and σ is the stochastic
component in agricultural production. This functional form is more flexible
than most widely used Cobb-Douglas or translog functions in the literature
because it does not require us to make specific assumptions on capital and
other inputs that may affect agricultural production.
In order to account for the differences in productivity between genders, we
modify Q¯ and define it as:
12
Q¯ = Lλmm L
λf
f z
λ1
1 f1(z2, F, σ) (2.5)
where Lm, Lf are male and female labor respectively, z1 is one variable input,
z2 represents remaining variable inputs and f(.) is a non-parametric function
as shown above.
Agricultural productivity is affected by random weather shocks. In order
to account for the weather shocks, we define the production function as,
Q = Q¯e (2.6)
where  is a random weather shock and E(e) = 1. Farmers do not know Q
so their MPL is based on the expectation of Q. E(Q(Lm, Lf , z;F )) = E(Q¯).
MPLi = p
∂E(Q)
∂Li
= p
∂Q¯
∂Li
= pλiQ¯/Li (2.7)
Also, from the utility maximization, the variable input z1 is used until its
marginal product is equal to price, i.e.
pz = p
∂Q¯
∂z1
= λ1p
Q¯
z1
(2.8)
Combining equations 2.7 and 2.8,
MPLi ≡ w∗i =
λiz1pz
λ1Li
(2.9)
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To estimate shadow wages, it is necessary to estimate the λ parameters.
Shadow income for agriculture households is the sum of profit from agricul-
tural production, unearned income, wage income, and the value of household
production. Shadow income can be defined mathematically as,
y∗ = pQ(Lm, Lf , z;F )− pzz + wmMm + wfMf + Y + V (Nm, Nf ; J) (2.10)
The shadow income in equation 2.10 includes household production V (Nm, Nf ; J).
The household production is semi-parametrically defined as V = Nf2(K)
where N is the labor input for household production and f2(.) is the non-
parametric function that takes in K, the vector of other inputs that affect
household production. N = δmNm + δfNf , where δm and δf are coeffi-
cients of efficiency for male and female labor. For household production,
labor can be substitutable between males and females. Defining the house-
hold production function as a general production function V = N δf2(k),
and using the marginal productivity of labor MPL = δV/N , we can derive
V (Nm, Nf ; J) = MPLmNm + MPLfNf by setting δ = 1 to facilitate com-
putation.2 We know MPLi = w
∗
i , regardless of market failure. The labor
supply function can be defined as hi = hi(w
∗
m, w
∗
f , y
∗;A). Most papers as-
sume a log-log form for shadow estimation equations. Becasue the log form
will not work for the non-linear shadow wages and shadow income param-
eters, we use labor supply functions at levels for econometric estimation as
2We can set household production to 0 to estimate the MPL for only agricultural
production. However, in this framework, if we make that assumption we will not satisfy
the condition to implement minimum distance approach as minimum distance requires
having at least as many reduced form parameters as structural parameters.
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follows:
hm = αm1w
∗
m + αm2w
∗
f + αm3y
∗ + αm4Am + ωm (2.11a)
hf = αf1w
∗
f + αf2w
∗
m + αf3y
∗ + αf4Af + ωf (2.11b)
The shadow wage is calculated by solving equations 2.11a and 2.11b by
substituting w∗i and y
∗ from equations 2.9 and 2.10. Dependent variables in
regression equations 2.11a and 2.11b are total labor supplied by male (hm)
and females (hf ) in a household, respectively. The distribution of the depen-
dent variables is presented in Figure 2.3.
2.3.2 Reduced Form Solution Estimation
Plugging equations 2.9 and 2.10 into equations 2.11a and 2.11b. We get,
Male equation in reduced form:
hm = αm1
(
λm
λ1
Pz1z1
Lm
)
+αm2
(
λf
λ1
Pz1z1
Lf
)
+αm3
(
Pz1z1
λ1
− PzZ + Y + wmMm + wfMf
)
+(
λm
λ1
Pz1z1
Lm
)
Nm +
(
λf
λ1
Pz1z1
Lf
)
Nf ) + αmiAi
hm = αm1
λm
λ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
β1
Pz1z1
Lm
+αm2
λf
λ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
β2
Pz1z1
Lf
+
αm3
λ1︸︷︷︸
β3
Pz1z1− αm3︸︷︷︸
β4
(PzZ +Y +wmMm +
wfMf ) + αm3
λm
λ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
β5
Pz1z1
(
Nm
Lm
)
+ αm3
λf
λ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
β6
Pz1z1
(
Nf
Lf
)
+ αmi︸︷︷︸
β7
Ai
hm = β1x1 + β2x2 + β3x3 + β4x4 + β5x5 + β6x6 + controls+ error (2.12)
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Female equation in reduced form:
hf = αf1
(
λf
λ1
Pz1z1
Lf
)
+αf2
(
λm
λ1
Pz1z1
Lm
)
+αf3
(
Pz1z1
λ1
− PzZ + Y + wmMm + wfMf
)
+(
λm
λ1
Pz1z1
Lm
)
Nm +
(
λf
λ1
Pz1z1
Lf
)Nf
)
+ αfiAi
hf = αf1
λf
λ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
δ1
Pz1z1
Lf
+ αf2
λm
λ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
δ2
Pz1z1
Lm
+
αf3
λ1︸︷︷︸
δ3
Pz1z1− αf3︸︷︷︸
δ4
(PzZ + Y + wmMm +
wfMf ) + αf3
λf
λ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
δ5
Pz1z1
(
Nf
Lf
)
+ αf3
λm
λ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
δ6
Pz1z1
(
Nm
Lm
)
+ αfi︸︷︷︸
δ7
Ai
hf = δ1X1 + δ2X2 + δ3X3 + δ4X4 + δ5X5 + δ6X6 + controls+ error (2.13)
2.3.3 Structural Parameter Estimation
The estimating equations ( 2.12 and 2.13 ) are highly nonlinear in the
structural parameters. A previous study (Le, 2009) proposes the nonlinear
generalized method of moments estimation. However, the nonlinearities are
so severe that it is difficult to achieve convergence of the nonlinear estimator.
Le (2009) recognizes this convergence problem and implements an iterative
estimation procedure that takes advantage of the reduced form equation,
which is linear in its parameters, but the iterative procedure requires an ar-
bitrary selection of starting values on each iteration.
Alternatively, estimating structural parameters is ideal for minimum dis-
tance estimation proposed by Rothenberg (1973). We adopt this estimation
strategy that requires consistent estimation of the reduced form equation,
followed by estimation of the structural parameters by minimizing the Eu-
clidean distance between the unknown structural parameters and the esti-
mated reduced form parameters. Derivation of structural parameters in our
paper is depicted in Table 2.1. βs and δs in 2.12 and 2.13 are the reduced
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form parameters, αs and λs are structural parameters, which are denoted as
θ.
The first challenge to identification is the consistent estimate of the re-
duced form parameters. The reduced form variables are complicated nonlin-
ear functions of the data. Those functions almost certainly contain variables
that are correlated with unobserved variables at the regional and household
levels. Following Benjamin (1992), we control for unobserved regional vari-
ables by controlling for ward-level fixed effects. The ward is the smallest
observed geographical unit in the household data. The sampling scheme
sampled multiple households in each ward.
In the absence of natural experiments or instruments satisfying exclusion to
correct for household level unobserved variables, we employ imperfect proxy
variables to mitigate the confounding effects of household level unobserved
variables. Proxy variables must exhibit two properties. First, they must
be correlated with unobserved variables, a property that cannot be verified.
Second, they must be redundant in the estimation equation. That is, if we
include proxy variables, a, in an estimation equation E(y|x), then we must
have:
E(y|x, q) = E(y|x, q, a)
That is, the proxy variables must have no explanatory power after the con-
trol variables, x, and unobserved variables, q, are accounted for. Their only
significance in the estimating equation is due to their correlation with the
unobserved variables. The response variable in the reduced form equations is
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labor supply. The control variables include wage and income variables that
are standard explanatory variables for labor supply. We control for demo-
graphic shifters such as number of adult males in the household, number of
adult females in the household, and number of children in the household.
Age of household head, age squared, and educational dummy variables are
used as proxy variables to capture unobserved level effects such as ability
and experience. We argue that these variables should satisfy the redundancy
requirement of proxy variables.
Thus, a consistent estimation of the reduced form parameters is accom-
plished with a combination of regional fixed effects and household-level proxy
variables. The consistent reduced form parameters, βˆ, are used to recover
structural parameters, θ, through the minimum distance estimation, which
can be considered a special case of nonlinear generalized method of mo-
ments. Minimum distance estimation requires at least as many reduced form
parameters as structural parameters, otherwise the structural parameters are
not uniquely identified. In our model, the number of structural parameters
equals the number of reduced form parameters, so we have exact identifica-
tion. Given the mapping f(θ) = βˆ from structural to reduced form param-
eters, minimum distance estimation estimates structural parameters, θ, by
minimizing:
(
f(θ)− βˆ
)′
Vˆ −1
(
f(θ)− βˆ
)
where Vˆ is the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced form parameters.
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2.4 Data
The data in this study come from the 2010 Nepal Living Standard Sur-
vey Phase III (NLSS III) which follows the Living Standards Measurement
Survey (LSMS) methodology developed and promoted by the World Bank.
The NLSS III contains a survey of 5,988 households from about 500 primary
sampling units throughout the country. The survey covers both rural and
urban areas of Nepal. We define a household as an agricultural household if
(a) the household has non-zero revenue from crops or livestock, and (b) the
household head’s main occupation is agriculture even though the head can
have multiple jobs.
The sample in the analysis consists of 2,246 households after dropping
households that do not match the definition of agricultural household above.
In addition, households with missing fertilizer costs are dropped because
we use fertilizer in estimating the shadow wage. Individuals with no own
farm labor are also dropped from the analysis to reach the sample size used
in our analysis. All the individuals in a household below the age of 14 are
characterized as children. Table 2.2 depicts the mean and standard deviation
of variables used in the analysis. To deal with the issues of extreme outliers
in the sample, we winsorize the data at the 10% level for labor supply, inputs,
and market wage variables in the analysis.3
3Without winsorizing we were getting estimates for shadow wages to be 100 times at
the top end of shadow wage distribution
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2.5 Results
The reduced form estimates are obtained from equations 2.12 and 2.13 sep-
arately. The equations are estimated separately to satisfy the identification
condition for minimum distance estimation. Joint estimation of equations
will not satisfy the crucial condition for the minimum distance approach. The
first columns of Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 are ordinary least squares (OLS) es-
timates of reduced form coefficients. The estimates in the second columns of
Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 account for fixed effects and household proxies. The
proxy variables strip out the marginal effects from unobserved attributes in
significant ways. The reduced form estimates cannot be interpreted because
they are complex variables. The reduced form estimates are used to recover
the structural parameters using minimum distance estimation. In Table 2.5,
we show the structural parameters recovered from the reduced form model.
These structural parameters are used to calculate shadow wages as shown in
equation 2.9.
Estimates of shadow wages of males and females using λ values and the
mean of the data are 130 and 115 rupees per hour respectively, and they
show a statistically significant difference after controlling for ward-level fixed
effects.4 Table 2.6 shows the shadow wage by gender at each quantile of the
own farm labor distribution. Figure 2.4 presents the kernel density of shadow
wages by gender showing close overlap in the marginal productivity of males
and females.
The shadow wage is calculated using equation 2.9 for males and females.
42011 Exchange rate: 1 USD = Rs (70 to 85) Central Bank of Nepal
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We use λm and λ1 from equation 2.11a to estimate the shadow wage for
males in equation 2.9. Similarly, λf and λ1 from equation 2.11b are used
to estimate the shadow wage for females in 2.9. αm1 is the coefficient of
male shadow wage in the male labor supply equation 2.11a while, αm2 is the
coefficient of female shadow wage in the male labor supply equation 2.11a.
The result from male labor supply equation 2.11a shows a reduction of 0.038
male hours per day with an increase in shadow wages by 1 rupee per hour.
The coefficient of shadow income αm3 implies an increase of 0.002 male hours
as a result of a 1 rupee increase in income. The change in the coefficient of
female shadow wage in the male equation is not statistically significant. For
the female labor supply equation 2.11b, the change in shadow wage of male
αf2 is not statistically significant. The female αf1 shows a reduction of 0.027
female hours per day with an increase of 1 rupee per hour. The coefficient for
shadow income αf3, also positive, shows the increase of 0.001 female hours
per day as a result of a 1 rupee increase in income.
One question that can be raised based on the structural estimates obtained
in the analysis is the signs of shadow wage and shadow income parameters
in the labor supply equations. Economic theory predicts that the increase in
prices of a good should increase the supply of that commodity in the mar-
ket. In this context, the commodity is the amount of labor hours supplied
and the price in this case is the shadow wage. A couple of points should be
noted to understand the parameters obtained in the current analysis. First,
in previous work, labor supply equations are modeled as a function of ob-
served wage and observed income. The labor supply equations 2.12 and 2.13
in this analysis use shadow wages and shadow income. Second, the labor
supply of agricultural households aggregates labor supplied to farm, mar-
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ket, and household work. The coefficients for shadow wage is interpreted as
the change in labor supplied when marginal productivity changes. For indi-
viduals who are already using a large number of hours for labor, we would
not expect individuals to supply more labor when there is an increase in
marginal productivity. Previous theoretical and empirical work shows that
in poor settings, we might expect farmers to behave similar to having a back-
ward bending supply curve (Hanoch, 1965) and (Huang, 1976). With regards
to the coefficients for shadow income the result suggests the income effect
dominating the substitution effect.
To further illustrate this point, we report the results of regressing market
wages and unearned income on market labor supply in Table 2.8, own farm
labor supply in Table 2.9, and household chores in Table 2.10. The results
in these specifications indicate that an increase in market wage will increase
the labor supply to the market but decrease labor supplied to own farm and
household chores, implying substitution of types of work. With regards to
shadow income, the coefficient means the change in labor supplied in re-
sponse to unit increase in shadow income. Shadow income includes the value
of household production and profit from the farm in addition to unearned
income. If it only represents the unearned income then the coefficients for
unearned income would be negative as shown in Tables 2.7, 2.8, 2.9 and
2.10. Since it represents household production and profits, we would expect
the change in shadow income to have an effect on household production and
profits, which would be translated to an increase in total labor supplied. The
parameters obtained in the analysis imply a decrease in leisure when shadow
income increases. In the context of rural Nepal, limited ability to substitute
household chores such as cooking to restaurant food, fetching water to tap
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water in the absence of infrastructure and services, an increase in income
will not increase the amount of leisure. More often, increased income would
lead to better and more varied meals, which would increase the time spent
on preparation and cooking of food. The similarity in marginal productiv-
ity of labor of male and female as depicted in Figure 2.4 implies household
productivity and labor market productivity can be significantly increased by
supporting investments to encourage female roles in the production process.
2.6 Conclusion and Discussion
The shadow wage of women is lower than the shadow wage of men in agri-
cultural households in Nepal, on average. However, the distribution shows
the range in productivity is similar (Figure 2.4). In this paper shadow wages
have been measured with a semi-parametric household production function.
One potential limitation of the estimates is the cross-sectional data. We
might not fully account for time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. We con-
trol for unobserved regional variables by performing fixed effects estimation
at the ward level. For the estimation of shadow wages, labor supplied to
own farm plays a very important role in this framework. The result from
this study suggests that females have a higher marginal productivity of labor
in household production compared to the market wage they receive. The
average market wage is significantly higher for males than females but the
shadow wage shows that females have similar productivity to males. This
finding suggests that females are underpaid in the labor market compared to
their marginal productivity, calling for direct intervention for equal compen-
sation and to end discriminatory practices.
23
The method used in the paper can be applied to various outcomes where
we cannot directly observe wages. This method can be used in studies to
better understand the non-monetary labor contribution of members of the
household. It can also be used to understand the productivity in informal
labor markets. The estimates of the shadow wage obtained can be used
to determine household labor allocation in agricultural households since we
cannot observe the market wages for families that work on their own farms.
This paper provides a new estimation method with a flexible functional form
to estimate the shadow wage.
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2.7 Tables and Figures
Figure 2.1: Hours supplied in house work by gender
Figure 2.2: Hours supplied on own farm by gender
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Figure 2.3: Household total labor supply by gender
Figure 2.4: Kernel distribution of shadow wage by gender
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Table 2.1: Structural parameters derived from reduced form parameters
θ β
θ1
β1β4
β5
θ2
β5
β3
θ3
β3
β4
θ4
β2β4
β6
θ5
β6
β3
θ6 β4
Table 2.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Own farm labor male(Lm) (Hr/Day) 11.871 6.112
Own farm labor female(Lf) (Hr/Day) 10.784 5.861
Market labor male(Mm) (Hr/Day) 5.146 5.771
Market labor female(Mf) (Hr/Day) 1.874 3.167
Household labor male(Nm) (Hr/Day) 4.198 2.853
Household labor female(Nf) (Hr/Day) 10.674 4.641
Total labor male (Hm) (Hr/Day) 21.899 10.291
Total labor female (Hf) (Hr/Day) 24.22 10.052
Market wage male(wm) (Rs/hr) 133.867 149.594
Market wage female (wf) (Rs/hr) 36.587 64.842
Cost of all input (Rs/day) 28.674 25.806
Cost of fertilizer (Rs/day) 7.891 7.399
UUnearned Income (Rs/day) 6.063 10.354
No. of male 1.632 0.898
No. of female 1.919 0.979
No. of children 1.908 1.623
N 2246
27
Table 2.3: Reduced form estimates for male equation
(OLS) (Cluster)
Hm Hm
x1 -8.043∗∗∗ -5.845∗∗∗
(0.782) (0.648)
x2 -0.325 -0.0747
(0.209) (0.181)
x3 0.723∗∗∗ 0.442∗∗∗
(0.0505) (0.0535)
x4 0.00279∗∗∗ 0.00238∗∗∗
(0.0000699) (0.0000809)
x5 0.529∗∗∗ 0.368∗∗∗
(0.0679) (0.0672)
x6 0.0365∗ -0.00537
(0.0149) (0.0112)
No. of Male 4.095∗∗∗
(0.232)
No. of Female -0.569∗∗∗
(0.164)
No. of Children 0.448∗∗∗
(0.0950)
Age 0.0197
(0.0730)
Age sq -0.000157
(0.000732)
Formal Education 0.872
(1.314)
Primary Education 1.754
(1.275)
Secondary Education 1.153
(1.419)
High School or more -0.474
(1.329)
Constant 16.59∗∗∗ 10.17∗∗∗
(0.277) (2.257)
N 2246 2246
Fixed effect No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.4: Reduced form estimates for female equation
(1) (2)
Hf Hf
X1 -4.924∗∗∗ -2.611∗∗∗
(0.334) (0.234)
X2 -0.524 0.178
(0.317) (0.315)
X3 0.528∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗
(0.0358) (0.0439)
X4 0.000940∗∗∗ 0.000857∗∗∗
(0.0000947) (0.000104)
X5 0.228∗∗∗ 0.0819∗∗∗
(0.0206) (0.0185)
X6 0.0342 -0.0167
(0.0527) (0.0473)
No. of Male -0.695∗∗
(0.245)
No. of Female 5.036∗∗∗
(0.197)
No. of Children 1.097∗∗∗
(0.139)
Age 0.230∗∗
(0.0820)
Age sq -0.00233∗∗
(0.000826)
Formal Education 2.372
(1.514)
Primary Education 1.451
(1.438)
Secondary Education 2.027
(1.716)
High School or more 1.678
(1.790)
Constant 21.89∗∗∗ 5.451∗
(0.325) (2.201)
N 2246 2246
Fixed effect No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.5: Structural estimates for male and female equations using cluster
estimation
(Male equation 11a) (Female equation 11b)
αi1 -0.0378
∗∗∗ -0.0273∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006)
λi 0.834
∗∗∗ 0.409 ∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.131)
λ1 0.005
∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
αi2 0.033 -0.009
(0.137) (0.025)
λ−i -0.012 -0.084
(0.025) (0.238)
αi3 0.002
∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
i - male or female -i female or male
Table 2.6: Shadow wage of male and female by quantile (Rs)
Shadow Wage Male Shadow Wage Female p-value
mean 129.990 115.190 0.000
std. Err 3.370 4.018
sd 159.710 190.450
25th percentile 27.728 18.689
50th percentile 76.119 49.548
75th percentile 163.119 119.325
95th percentile 444.651 484.039
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Table 2.7: Labor Supply Equation (total) with wage and income
(1) (2)
Hm Hf
Wage male 0.0230∗∗∗ -0.000116
(0.001) (0.001)
Wage female 0.00870∗∗ 0.0514∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Income -0.0670∗∗∗ -0.0732∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.016)
No. of male 5.768∗∗∗ -0.211
(0.213) (0.195)
No. of female -0.257 5.756∗∗∗
(0.197) (0.180)
No. of children 0.727∗∗∗ 1.299∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.104)
Constant 8.594∗∗∗ 9.619∗∗∗
(0.465) (0.426)
No. of Households 2246 2246
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.8: Labor Supply Equation (market) with wage and income
(1) (2)
Mm Mf
Wage male 0.0283∗∗∗ 0.000438∗
(0.001) (0.0001)
Wage female 0.0123∗∗∗ 0.0450∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0004)
Income -0.0384∗∗∗ -0.00233
(0.008) (0.003)
No. of male 0.754∗∗∗ 0.0146
(0.098) (0.034)
No. of female -0.271∗∗ 0.0468
(0.090) (0.031)
No. of children 0.113∗ 0.00230
(0.052) (0.0181)
Constant 0.217 0.0646
(0.213) (0.0741)
No. of Households 2246 2246
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.9: Labor Supply Equation (own-farm) with wage and income
(1) (2)
Lm Lf
Wage male -0.00138 -0.000422
(0.001) (0.001)
Wage female -0.00195 0.00726∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Income -0.0356∗∗ -0.0579∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011)
No. of male 3.587∗∗∗ -0.400∗∗
(0.146) (0.13)
No. of female 0.169 3.011∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.12)
No. of children 0.367∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.069)
Constant 5.463∗∗∗ 5.078∗∗∗
(0.318) (0.284)
No. of Households 2246 2246
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2.10: Labor Supply Equation (household work) with wage and income
(1) (2)
Nm Nf
Wage male -0.000989∗ -0.000227
(0.0004) (0.001)
Wage female -0.00206∗ -0.00210
(0.001) (0.00129)
Income -0.0049 -0.0123
(0.006) (0.008)
No. of male 1.057∗∗∗ 0.0896
(0.072) (0.099)
No. of female -0.163∗ 2.117∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.091)
No. of children 0.184∗∗∗ 0.818∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.053)
Constant 2.671∗∗∗ 5.087∗∗∗
(0.158) (0.216)
No. of Households 2246 2246
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
34
CHAPTER 3
THE USE OF REMITTANCES AND THE
STATUS OF POVERTY IN NEPAL
3.1 Introduction
Do the increased income opportunities of individuals due to migration
translate to improved living standards of migrant-sending households? The
hope of better economic opportunities motivates migration. Remittances are
the pathway on which migration can have a direct effect on the living stan-
dards of migrant-sending households. Remittances are the transfers made by
migrant workers to their families and relatives in the country of their origin.
The transfer mostly includes money and goods to the migrant’s household.
Remittances directly influence household budget constraints and affect the
consumption of various goods and services that were previously unattain-
able. The money transferred from migrants to households can provide more
disposable income for increased consumption, savings, investment in child’s
education, and home improvement, among others.
In the context of Nepal, migration is common on both the domestic and in-
ternational frontier. In recent years, international labor migration has surged,
mostly to the Middle East (26 percent) and South East Asia (9 percent)
(Sapkota, 2013). The increase in international migration has also increased
international remittances received by migrant-sending households. Remit-
tances comprise 25-30 percent of GDP in the recent years (Sapkota, 2013).
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Given the rise in the flow of international remittances to Nepal in recent
years, the questions I address are as follows: (1) How do the consumption
patterns differ between remittance-receiving households and non-receiving
households? (2) Do remittances affect the poverty status of Nepalese house-
holds? These questions are crucial to understanding the impact of labor
migration on poverty and the well-being of migrant-sending households be-
cause the volume of money that is being transferred is substantial to the
household as well as to the country’s economy. Because remittances are di-
rectly received by the households, expenditure analysis using a nationally
representative household survey provides a better picture of how households
are utilizing the money than looking at macroeconomic trends.
In 2012, remittances to developing countries were estimated at US$406
billion and by 2015 it is predicted to reach US$534 billion (Ratha, Mohapa-
tra, and Silwal, 2010). According to Ratha, Mohapatra, and Silwal (2010),
the volume and stability of remittances flowing to developing countries have
been higher than official development assistance and foreign direct invest-
ment. While official development assistance and foreign direct investments
help in development projects at the community or national level, they don’t
have a direct impact at the household level. The inflow of a large volume
of remittances to a developing country like Nepal can have a direct impact,
especially at the household level because remittances are directly received
by households. Nepal was the sixth-highest recipient of remittances (share
of GDP) in 2010 and 2011 among all countries (Sapkota, 2013). The total
amount of remittances received has been increasing in the recent years along
with number of migrants in Nepal. Figure 4.1 shows the migration and re-
mittances trends according the official estimates (The Ministry of Finance,
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2013). The increasing trend implies the increase in the proportion of migrants
and remittances receiving households. Hence, it is essential to understand the
direct impact of remittances at the household level. To understand house-
hold use of remittances in Nepal, this paper provides a comparison of the
consumption between households receiving remittances (domestic and inter-
national) and households that do not receive remittances.
The previous literature has documented the effects of remittances on var-
ious economic outcomes. The literature highlights the role of remittances
on risks and uncertainty, poverty, investments, income inequality, and en-
trepreneurship, among others. Some other common uses of remittances
include insurance against income risk and uncertainty, and a risk sharing
mechanism (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989; Niimi, Pham, and Reilly, 2008;
de la Briere, Sadoulet, de Janvry, and Lambert, 2002). Studies have found a
positive effect of remittances on poverty alleviation, reduction of income in-
equality, and investment in human and physical capital (Chiwuzulum Odozi,
Taiwo Awoyemi, and Omonona, 2010; Adams and Cuecuecha, 2010, 2013;
Jimenez-Soto and Brown, 2012; Yang, 2008). However, some studies have
shown that remittances can increase income inequality, corruption, and de-
crease institutional quality, the rule of law, government effectiveness and
overall welfare (Barham and Boucher, 1998; Gibson, McKenzie, and Still-
man, 2010; Wouterse, 2010; Abdih, Chami, Dagher, and Montiel, 2012). Us-
ing a cross-country analysis, the effect of remittances are found to be non-
monotonic, i.e., the benefits are strongest in low-income countries (Portes,
2009). Serino and Kim (2011) use a cross-country analysis to show the ef-
fect of remittances on welfare depends on the poverty quantile of the recip-
ient, with the poor benefiting the most from remittances. Findings from
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the studies mentioned above imply that the effects of remittances may be
heterogeneous, suggesting the presence of outstanding issues concerning the
distribution and intensity of the effects associated with remittances.
A recent study by Buckley and Hoffman (2012) points out that household
utilization of remittances can change based on institutional and cultural con-
text. Structural and infrastructural context strongly influences the ability of
individuals or families to invest remittances. The opportunities to use re-
mittances in entrepreneurial activities, durables, and investments can lead
to economic development. In the absence of institutions to facilitate invest-
ments and entrepreneurship, remittances can lead to increased consumption,
which may not improve the economic potential for future economic develop-
ment. It can lead to the low-level development trap, which serves as a vehicle
to produce more educated future migrants without better job potential do-
mestically leading to the better skilled to be attracted to the international
labor market (Kapur and McHale, 2005; Castles and Miller, 2009). Because
the institutional and cultural context have strong influences on how the re-
mittances are being utilized, it is essential to analyze each setting separately
to understand the actual effect of remittances for socio-economic policy rec-
ommendations (Glytsos, 2002).
Few studies have analyzed the effects of remittances in the context of
Nepal. Lokshin, Bontch-Osmolovski, and Glinskaya (2007) and Milligan
(2009) have used the Nepal Living Standard Survey II (NLSS2) to analyze
the effect of remittances on poverty and income effects on child welfare re-
spectively. Work-related migration, both domestic and international, can
be attributed to reduced incidence of poverty in Nepal (Lokshin, Bontch-
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Osmolovski, and Glinskaya, 2007). Increased income from remittances can
increase the likelihood that a child will go to school and decrease child labor
(Milligan, 2009). Thieme and Wyss (2005) perform a case study that eval-
uates the impact of remittances on foreign ex-army settlement. The study
finds that out-migration contributes to sustainable livelihood, increases in
financial capital, increases in child’s education, and the knowledge of mi-
gration. The findings from this study cannot be generalized to the present
context of Nepal because the current migration trend is mostly non-army
labor migration.
This paper utilizes NLSS3 to understand the expenditure behavior of
Nepalese households. As mentioned above, a few studies have used NLSS2
to analyze the effect of remittances, but the findings from these studies can’t
be generalized in present context due to the significant increase in migration.
Since NLSS2, which was collected in 2003, the number of international mi-
grants has almost tripled and the remittances have increased by almost five
times (The Ministry of Finance, 2013, 2014). Therefore, understanding the
spending patterns of households that receive remittances becomes even more
significant. More importantly, none of the studies have analyzed household
expenditure patterns. Therefore, this is one of the first papers to analyze the
effect of remittances on household expenditure using a nationally represen-
tative survey.
Studying migration is complex. Migration requires knowledge of jobs in
the potential destination, learning about the process of migrating to the des-
tination, financial resources to make migration possible, and adaptation at
the destination. The outcome of migration can affect the remittances sent
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to the households left behind. Given the dynamic nature of migration, it
is difficult to understand why individuals choose to migrate and send back
remittances. In the absence of a longitudinal data, it is difficult to capture
the migration history to understand this complex process. In the absence
of existing longitudinal data, I use cross-sectional data to understand how
remittances are being utilized by households in Nepal. Nepal provides an
important case to understand migration and remittances. 25 percent of the
population in Nepal falls below the poverty line and 66 percent of the pop-
ulation is dependent on agriculture. Nepal lies inbetween India and China,
the world’s most populated countries. The current trend of labor migration
from Nepal is mostly to the Middle Eastern countries like Qatar, UAE, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, and to Malaysia in the South East Asia. Nepal and India
share open borders with Nepalese citizens having equal rights to pursue jobs
in India like Indian citizens. Nepal’s current migration trend shows that mi-
grants are choosing distant opportunities over relatively cheaper alternatives,
suggesting that migrants tend to choose their destinations based on various
factors and not just on similar culture, language, and costs. Hence, Nepal
provides a unique case to understand migration and the role associated re-
mittances play in developing countries.
In this paper, I use a two-stage selection correction method controlling for
unobservable characteristics that could be determining expenditure shares
for remittance-receiving households (Adams and Cuecuecha, 2010, 2013). I
use instruments that are distinct for the receipt of remittances in the first
stage choice equation. In the second stage I analyze the impact of domestic
and international remittances on expenditure shares at the household level
in Nepal. Additionally, I estimate the effect of remittances on the poverty
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status of households. Based on the source of remittances (domestic, inter-
national, and both) I determine how remittance-receiving households differ
on the margins of expenditure categories such as food, durables, housing,
and education, among others. The decision to send an individual outside
their origin communities can be complicated due to various factors such as
information about destination, job search process, and transaction costs.
Also, various factors at home and abroad might influence the sending of
remittances, including the duration of migrantion. In the initial period of
migration, migrants mostly send remittances to repay loans for migration. I
construct variables that capture the duration of migrantion, i.e., migration is
less than a year, between 1 and 5 years, and greater than 5 years. Addition-
ally, I control for regional factors since they reflect infrastructure and culture
in the context of Nepal. Controlling observable factors within the household
as well as geographic factors, we may be able to distinguish recipients of
remittances from non-recipients. I estimate the impact of remittances by
creating a counterfactual group using characteristics of remittance-receiving
household with parameters from households not receiving remittances.
This paper contributes to the literature by investigating the role of remit-
tances on households’ expenditure shares and poverty. The main hypothesis
that are tested in this paper are as follows: (1) Do households receiving re-
mittances spend a higher share on consumption goods or on education and
investment of assets? (2) Do remittances effect the prevalence of poverty
in receiving households? To answer these questions, we need to divide the
expenditures into investment and consumption expenditures. Of the six cat-
egories of expenditure used in this analysis, food and other goods are con-
sumption categories. Home improvement, durables, and education can be
41
considered as investment in physical assets and human capital. Health can
be considered both human capital and consumption good. With regards to
prevalence of poverty, households can receive from migrants to cope with
extreme poverty for survival or to transfer money to invest in new ventures.
Remittances can relax financial constraints to pursue investment activities.
I have the following findings: at the mean value of household character-
istics, the households receiving remittances have lower expenditure shares
of food and higher expenditure shares of durables and other consumption
compared to the households without remittances after controlling for demo-
graphic, regional factors, and duration. I find that households with domestic
remittances spend a higher share on home improvements than households
that do not receive remittance. Households with international and both do-
mestic and international remittances spend a lower share on home improve-
ment. With regards to health expenditure, households receiving remittances
spend a lower share than household without remittances. I find that interna-
tional and both domestic and international remittance-receiving household
spend a higher share on education compared to household not receiving re-
mittances, while households with domestic remittances spend a lower share
than households receiving domestic remittances . In addition to households’
expenditure shares, the paper analyzes the role of remittances on poverty
status in Nepal. I find that the likelihood of being poor among households
not receiving remittances is higher compared to households receiving some
form of remittances, suggesting remittances could have effect on poverty of
migrant-sending households either because migrant-sending households are
better off and are able to send migrants elsewhere or they are poorer and
so are supported by the migrants. This paper contributes to the literature
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in the following ways. It provides an analysis of remittance use in Nepalese
households and is one of the first research papers to analyze the effect of
remittances on the household expenditure shares using a nationally repre-
sentative survey from Nepal.
3.2 Data
Data in this study come from the Nepal Living Standard Survey 2010
(NLSS3). NLSS3 is a nationally representative survey that follows the World
Bank’s Living Standard Measurement Study (LSMS) methodology. The sur-
vey has 5,988 households, representing all geographic and political regions of
Nepal. I use all the surveyed households in this analysis. Additionally, I use
the 2010 census data to construct variables such as number of international
migrants from a district, proportion of migrants to Qatar, Malaysia, India,
Saudi Arabia, among others at the district level to be used as instruments
in the analysis. The census data provides the number of migrants at various
destinations by districts. For the analysis that follows, I group the house-
holds into four categories (A) households who do not receive any remittances
(B) household receiving domestic remittances (C) household receiving inter-
national remittances (D) household receiving both types of remittances. In
the rest of the paper I will use type (A)-(D) to denote household types.
Table 3.1 illustrates the demographic variables used in the analysis by
household type. First compare demographic variables between remittance-
receiving households and households not receiving remittances. The number
of adult males in households receiving remittances is less than in households
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not receiving remittances, suggesting that most of the migrants tend to be
adult males. The households type (C) and (D) have more adult females than
households type (A) suggesting the households receiving international remit-
tances have more females left behind. The type (B) households have fewer
adult females than type (A) household suggesting that adult females migrate
with adult males within Nepal for domestic migration.
I control for the ethnic caste groups in the specification because the house-
holds of these caste groups have a history of working in the foreign military
and receiving remittances. Additionally, Table 3.1 shows the highest educa-
tional attainment within a household since human capital factors can have
an effect on migration and labor market outcomes, which thus influence re-
mittances. Type (A) tend to have higher advanced education than type (C)
and (D). Also, remittance-receiving households (type (B), (C), and (D)) tend
to have more individuals who have never attended schools.
The main outcome variables considered in the study are expenditure shares
on food, home improvement, durables, education, health and other expen-
diture. Summary statistics are shown in Table 3.2. Food shares include
expenditure on food items such as grains, cereal, dairy, meat, fruits, veg-
etables, spices, and beverages. Home improvement includes the expenses to
upgrade the house in the last year. Durables include jewelry, electronics,
vehicles and kitchen appliances. Education includes expenses on books, fees
and supplies to school. The health expenditure includes expenses on doctor
visit and medicines. Other expenditures on fuel, transportation, apparel,
newspaper, magazines, entertainment, and gifts.
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Table 3.3 shows the variation across regions in Nepal. Nepal has 3 distinct
geographic regions: Mountain, Hill, and Terai. Mountains and Hills have
limited access to roads. Column 1 shows the poverty line using the “cost of
basic needs” approach. Columns 3 and 4 show the remittances amount and
remittances as proportion of income. Columns 5 and 6 show the distance to
the capital and population in ward across regions. These variations could af-
fect the way migration networks are formed by households in their respective
regions. Table 3.4 shows the breakdown of poverty across household cate-
gories receiving remittances. I use the definition of poverty defined in the
NLSS3 survey, i.e., rgw poverty line is defined as the sum of expenditures on
food and non-food items based on the “cost of basic needs” approach. The
cost of basic needs approach is a commonly used approach to calculate the
poverty line using the cost of acquiring enough food for adequate nutrition
and adding essentials such as clothing and shelter (Haughton and Khandker,
2009; Laderchi, Saith, and Stewart, 2003). Based on this definition of the
poverty line, 18% of the households in the survey are poor. The number of
poor households under remittances receiving categories are as follows: 21%
of type (A) are poor, 15%, 19%, and 16% of type (B), (C), and (D) are poor
respectively.
3.3 Model
The spending on food, home improvement, durables, other expenditure,
education, and health can be different across expenditure levels of remittance-
receiving households. To understand the marginal expenditure pattern, I
need to choose an appropriate functional form that mathematically allows
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capturing a change in the marginal propensity to spend on various expendi-
ture levels. Functional forms that assume the same slopes across expendi-
ture levels are not appropriate because that would assume the expenditure
of households at all expenditure levels are constant. We need to have a func-
tional form that allows for households with different expenditure levels to
have different slopes. Hence, I use the Working-Lesser model in this analy-
sis. The model relates the budget shares linearly to the logarithm of total
expenditure while allowing for different slopes at different expenditure levels.
The level of aggregation is the expenditure category such as food, housing,
durables, education, other household expenditure, and health. The model
takes the following functional form:
Cij/Exp = βij + aij/Exp+ γij(logExp), (3.1)
where Cij/Exp is the share of expenditure on good i by household j in total
expenditure (Exp) at the household level. The adding-up restriction of the
expenditure function requires that all budget shares add up to one, mathe-
matically
∑
Cij/Exp = 1. Equation 3.1 is equivalent to the Engel form:
Cij = aij + βijExp+ γijExp(logExp), (3.2)
where Cij is the amount of expenditure on good i by household j. The re-
lationship between the expenditure on good i with the total expenditure of
the household is shown in Equation 3.2. To compare the expenditure behav-
ior of households with different levels of income, several socio-economic and
regional factors other than expenditure must be taken into account. The ob-
served differences in expenditures may be due to the difference in household
composition and geographic regions, among others. These household-specific
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variables need to be included in the model to allow the shift in the intercept
and slope of the Engel functions. The ability to incorporate shifts in inter-
cept and slope is a valuable property to be able to distinguish households
at different expenditure levels. If the model imposes the same slope across
expenditure levels, then in cross-sectional analysis behavioral differences be-
tween households with differing characteristics cannot be observed, leading
to the same effect across all the households. Let Zk denote the kth household
characteristic. The complete model after including the household character-
istics is written as:
Cij = aij +βijExp+γijExp(logExp)+
∑
k
[(µijk)Zjk + θijk(Exp)Zjk]. (3.3)
In terms of expenditure share, the above equation is :
Cij/Exp = aij/Exp+βij+γij(logExp)+
∑
k
[(µijk)Zjk/Exp+ θijkZjk]. (3.4)
Including the various household characteristics is important because it al-
lows the flexibility to calculate the marginal budget shares that can vary with
household characteristics. The marginal budget shares (MBS) and average
budget shares (ABS) for i are as follows:
MBSij = dCij/dExp = βij + γij(1 + logExp) +
∑
k
[(θijk)Zjk]. (3.5)
ABSij = Cij/Exp. (3.6)
Various factors can determine why some households receive remittances
and why some do not. In the absence of natural experiments to exploit the
causal mechanism for receiving remittances, selection on unobservables can
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affect the outcome. To account for the possible choices a household makes
about receiving remittances, I use the Dubin and McFadden (1984) method,
which is a generalization of the Heckman two-stage method of selection cor-
rection. The assumption is that households first choose the state s : (A)
not receiving remittances (B) receiving domestic remittances (C) receiving
international remittances and (D) receiving both domestic and international
remittances. Based on the choice a household makes for state s, they decide
the optimal consumption for goods. Some factors can affect both the choice
of state s and the consumption behavior. Failing to account for the unob-
served correlation between choice and consumption can lead to bias. The
selection correction method can help mitigate the bias if the choice model is
estimated using a logit framework. However, the logit framework requires the
independent of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption. I only observe the
state s being chosen by the household thus cannot verify the IIA assumption
given I only observe one state per household. The study by Bourguignon,
Fournier, and Gurgand (2007), however, shows that Dubin and McFadden
(1984) performs better than other selection methods in Monte Carlo experi-
ments even when independence of irrelevant alternatives assumptions are not
met.1
In this paper, I proceed by using the selection correction approach by
Dubin and McFadden (1984). The λsi are the selection correction terms
obtained from the first stage estimation. The first stage involves estimat-
ing the probability of receiving remittances given household and regional
characteristics including possible instruments for migration and remittances.
1The selmlog command by Marc Gurgand and Martin Fournier in STATA, performs
this estimation Bourguignon, Gurgand, and Fournier (2002).
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The migration and remittance decisions can be endogenous because these
are decisions made by individuals taking into account various other factors
that are not observable to the analyst. To cope with the problem of en-
dogeneity, I use instruments that are likely to affect the migration network,
which can affect migration and remittances decisions. The instruments I have
considered are community level variables, which are not under the control
of an individual household. However, these variables can affect the migra-
tion and remittance decision of an individual through the social network by
providing information and resources for migration. The first stage selection
equation includes variables such as age, gender, education of household head,
the composition of household members such as children, older members, and
gender compositions along with the instruments. The rationale to include
these demographic variables is because human capital variables and house-
hold characteristics can affect the probability of migration. Incorporating
the selection correction, λsi, from the first stage of the estimation procedure
the budget share equation takes the following form:
Csi/Exp = asi/Exp+βsi+γsi(logExp)+
∑
j
[(µsij)Zj/Exp+ θsijZj ]+
∑
s
pisiλsi+vsi.
(3.7)
In the final specification, I use the number of migrants in the district and
the proportion of migrants to Malaysia and Qatar out of the total number of
migrants in the district in the first stage to obtain the independent variation
in the first stage choice equation.2 The number of migrants in the districts
can influence the networks of individuals. Migration is a risky process that in-
volves incomplete information regarding the destination and job search cost.
2I have considered are the distance to nearest market, distance to the capital from
district headquarters, the population of the ward, and age of household head times distance
to the capital. However, these instruments do not satisfy the over-identification conditions
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If more migrants are in a community, the information from the previous
rounds of migrants can provide potential migrants with information related
to migration, job search, and help at the destination on arrival. The working
conditions, wage structure in the destination, culture and opportunities of
destination are more readily available within a social network. Nepal’s social
fabric is heavily dependent on social ties. In such a setting having someone
with information about the destination can ease migration fears or concerns.
The number of migrants in a district can be a good proxy for a migration
network to explain migration trends (Mckenzie and Rapoport, 2007; McKen-
zie and Rapoport, 2010).
Qatar and Malaysia are two popular destinations for youth migrants in
Nepal, accounting for 16 percent and 9 percent respectively (Sapkota, 2013).
Using the data available in the Census, I create a proportion of migrants
to the two major migrant destinations for instruments. Previous literature
has used labor market conditions at the migrant destinations as a source
of exogenous variation (Adams and Cuecuecha, 2010, 2013; Yang, 2008). I
perform Wald test for joint significance of the instruments and find they are
significant at 1% level.
Hence, the first stage choice function can be estimated as follows:
Prob(Y=receive remittances) = f(Human capital variables of household mem-
bers such as level of education, age, ethnicity, composition of household, ur-
ban dummy, regional dummies, and instruments)
In the second stage, the selection correction term (λ) is used to estimate
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the coefficients of the budget share, Equation 3.7. The coefficient of selection
term captures the correlation between error terms of the consumption and
choice equation. As shown in Table 3.2 there are six different expenditure
categories. 3 I estimate five out of six expenditure equations and use the
adding up to conditions recover the parameters for the sixth equation. Pa-
rameters must satisfy the following conditions when we add up Equation 3.7
across six categories:
∑
i
βis = 1,
∑
i
αis = 0,
∑
i
γis = 0,
∑
i
µis = 0,
∑
i
θis = 0, and∑
i
piis = 0.
I use these conditions to retrieve the parameters for the sixth equation.
The marginal budget shares (MBS) after including the selection correction
terms from the first stage estimation are as follows:
E(MBSi|s = m) = βi + γi(1 + logExp) +
∑
j
[θijZj] +
∑
s
piisλs (3.8)
where s= type of household.
Given the multiple categories of remittances recipients, the framework in
this paper can be used to make comparisons among households that do not
receive remittances and different types of remittances-receiving households.
Lechner (2002) provides a framework for evaluating multiple treatments, sug-
gesting that pairwise treatment is enough to calculate the average treatment
3Food, home improvement, durables, other expenditure, education and health
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effect on the treated. Hence, average treatment effect on the treated (ATT)
of receiving remittances compared to non-remittances household is obtained
as the difference between E(MBSm|s = m) and E(MBSn|s = m), follow-
ing Lechner (2002). E(MBSm|s = m) is the estimated marginal budget
share of households that choose action m-receive domestic remittances, con-
ditioning on the characteristics of household m-receive domestic remittance.
E(MBSn|s = m) is the estimated marginal budget share of households that
choose action n- not receive remittances, conditioning on the characteristics
of household m-receive domestic remittance. The estimate allows me the
ability to create the counterfactual MBS based on observable characteristics
to compare the effects of remittances across household categories.
To understand the role of remittances on poverty, I estimate a multinomial
logit model. The multinomial logit model allows for the outcome variable to
be different by the type of household receiving remittance and the effect on
poverty after selection correction. In addition to multinomial logit, I esti-
mate the probit model and compare the predicted probability for poverty
using the two models.
3.4 Results
I estimate the two-stage multinomial logit model. Table 3.5 reports the
first stage of the multinomial logit estimates where households not receiving
remittances are treated as the base outcome. The first stage controls for
household demographic and human capital characteristics. Additionally, it
also controls for duration, urban, and ethnic caste of the households. Table
52
3.5 also includes the instruments used in the analysis. The number of mi-
grants in the district is statistically significant, suggesting that the number
of migrants in a community can increase the likelihood of both domestic and
international migration. The proportion of migrants to Qatar and Malaysia,
two major destinations for Nepalese migrants are significant only for type
(B). The proportion of migrants in Qatar causes a decrease in domestic re-
mittances while the proportion of migrants to Malaysia causes an increase
in domestic remittances. The explanation for the unexpected signs of these
variables is not obvious given the opposite signs. The proportion of migrants
to Qatar and Malaysia are not significant for type (C) and (D), which is also
puzzling.
Table 3.6 displays the second stage estimates for log of expenditure, which
represents the solution for expenditure shares in equation (3.7).4 Two panels
represents selection controlled and OLS estimates. The table in the appendix
for the second stage shows that failing to control for selection may lead to bias
as shown in food share estimates for type (A) and type (C) households and
home improvement and other expenditure shares for type (C) households.
However, in the absence of good instruments it is hard to say if the bias is
totally corrected with selection correction method because the parameters
estimates in Table 3.6 are not that different.
Table 3.7 shows that the budget shares estimated at the mean values dif-
fer across the households receiving remittances. The table is divided into 3
panels. Panel 1 is the comparison between estimated marginal budget shares
between type (A) and type (B) households, panel 2 is the comparison between
4Full tables are in the Appendix
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type (A) and type (C) households, and panel 3 is the comparison between
type (A) and type (D) households. Column [1] and [2] are the estimated
marginal budget shares for type of households in the panel. Column [3] is the
counterfactual MBS estimated using characteristics of remittance-receiving
households and selection corrected parameters of column[1] households. Col-
umn[4] shows the average treatment effect on the treated. Table 3.8 shows
the Oaxaca decomposition of type (B), (C), and (D) with type (A) based on
the characteristics, coefficients, and interactions. The comparison between
type (A) and (B) shows the significant difference in household characteristics.
For type (A) and (C) there are significant difference in coefficients except for
education shares, which show differences in characteristics, coefficients and
interactions. Similarly for type (A) and (D) there is significant difference in
coefficients for food, durables, education, and health shares while difference
in food interactions.
For households with domestic remittances, receiving remittances affects
the increase in shares of expenditure to home improvement, durables, and
other expenditure and the decrease in share on food, education, and health
as shown in column[4] of Table 3.7 . For households with international remit-
tances, receiving remittances increases the shares of expenditure to durables,
other expenditure, and education. I find decreases in expenditure shares
to food, home improvements, and health. For households that receive both
international and domestic remittances, expenditure share on food, home
improvement, and health decreases while increases in durables, other expen-
ditures, and education. The results suggests that households receiving remit-
tances are decreasing the share of food expenditures. Households receiving
international and both domestic and international remittances spend a higher
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share on education, suggesting the possibility of sending their children to pri-
vate or more expensive schools, which is common in Nepal. However, they
are decreasing the share of expenditure on home improvement. The home
improvement variables only include repairs to existing home but does not
include construction of new homes. Hence, we cannot rule out the possi-
bility of newer home with fewer repairs. The health expenditure shares are
decreasing for households with remittances. Health is both human capital
and a consumption good. In the context of Nepal, health services are not as
common in villages and the services are used mostly when someone is sick
rather than regular check-ups periodically. Hence, it can be thought of as
consumption expenditure given the decrease in health expenditure shares for
all the remittances receiving households.
Table 3.9 shows the estimates for the second stage multinomial logit model
after controlling for selection correction to understand the effect of remit-
tances on poverty. Table 3.10 shows the estimated probability of poverty.
The first row shows the probability calculation at means using the probit
framework while the second row shows the probability calculation at means
using the selection correction multinomial framework. The likelihood of be-
ing poor decreases with households receiving remittances when calculated at
the mean of the variables. The results shows that remittances have an effect
on poverty status in Nepal.
3.5 Conclusion and Discussion
This paper analyzes the role of remittances on the expenditure shares of
households and poverty using nationally representative NLSS3 data from
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Nepal. The paper finds that households receiving remittances spend a larger
share on durables and other expenditures. The household receiving interna-
tional and both international and domestic remittances spend a higher share
on education. The households receiving remittances spend less on food. The
decrease in home improvement could imply that household type (C) and (D)
actually may have newer constructions thus requiring less home improvement.
The paper analyzes the effect of remittances on poverty. The paper finds
the receipt of remittances reduces the likelihood of being poor. The probabil-
ity of being poor is lowest for households that receive domestic remittances
followed by household receiving both domestic and international remittances
and international remittances respectively.
In Nepal, international remittances constitute almost 30 percent of GDP.
Understanding the role remittances play on consumption and poverty is im-
portant to address the debate on the effect of remittances at the household
level. In the absence of panel data to understand the dynamic impact of
remittances, the cross-sectional approach can provide a general understand-
ing of the effect of remittances. This paper attempts to control for potential
selection issues using the two-stage method of controlling for unobservable
selection by employing instruments that can affect the migration and remit-
tances.
The findings of this paper suggest that remittances can increase spend-
ing on human capital, consumption expenditures, durables and decreases the
likelihood of poverty in the context of Nepal. Given the volume of remit-
tances Nepal receives, the utilization of remittances on investment activities
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is important for sustainable poverty reduction. We see the increase in ed-
ucational expenditure share for households receiving international and both
domestic and international remittances. International migration has been
rising in the recent years due to the absence of opportunities in the domes-
tic labor market. In the absence of opportunities for individuals to utilize
their education domestically, the scenario could imply more educated future
migrants suggesting lower-level development trap. The remittances received
by households should be used to create local opportunities to support the
economy and create jobs to mitigate the concern of the dependence of the
economy on remittances. It would be interesting to study if such opportu-
nities to create local jobs can have an effect on the migration and remittances.
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3.6 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics by remittances category
(A) (B) (C) (D)
No. adult male 1.388 1.092a 0.924b 0.826c
(0.93) (0.952) (0.912) (0.981)
No. adult female 1.472 1.447 1.577b 1.694c
(0.892) (0.919) (0.926) (0.985)
No. of children (5-14) 1.222 1.073a 1.323b 1.234
(1.244) (1.179) (1.290) (1.271)
Size of HH 4.941 4.475a 4.760b 4.902
(2.161) (2.301) (2.509) (2.772)
Head age (25 -59) 0.773 0.708a 0.727b 0.654c
(0.419) (0.455) (0.446) (0.476)
Dummy for old 0.304 0.326 0.322 0.363c
(0.46) (0.469) (0.467) (0.481)
Dummy for infant (less than 5) 0.343 0.312a 0.378b 0.429c
(0.475) (0.463) (0.485) (0.495)
Belongs to Ethnic Caste 0.688 0.619a 0.715 0.654
(0.463) (0.486) (0.452) (0.476)
Urban 0.402 0.285a 0.302 0.21
(0.49) (0.452) (0.459) (0.408)
Dummy for primary school(1-5) 0.195 0.182 0.214 0.225
(0.397) (0.386) (0.411) (0.418)
Dummy for secondary school(5-10) 0.337 0.336b 0.388 0.348
(0.473) (0.472) (0.487) (0.477)
Dummy for advance education(more than 10) 0.393 0.389 0.31b 0.35
(0.489) (0.488) (0.462) (0.477)
Dummy for never school 0.075 0.094a 0.088 0.078
(0.263) (0.292) (0.284) (0.268)
Duration (2-5years) 0.042 0.104a 0.217b 0.248c
(0.200) (0.306) (0.412) (0.432)
Duration (greater than 5) 0.053 0.249a 0.216b 0.302c
(0.224) (0.433) (0.412) (0.460)
Absentee in HH 0.257 0.533a 0.854b 0.921c
(0.437) (0.499) (0.353) (0.271)
No. of Households 2810 1460 1189 529
a, b, and c: at 5 percent significance level difference compared to A
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Table 3.2: Average budget shares
No remittances(A) Domestic remittances(B) International remittances(C) Both(D)
Food 0.633 0.644 0.628 0.603b
(0.241) (0.233) (0.239) (0.228)
Home Improvement 0.087 0.093 0.09 0.109b
(0.198) (0.196) (0.2) (0.214)
Durables 0.08 0.079 0.084 0.091
(0.097) (0.089) (0.09) (0.085)
Other 0.107 0.097a 0.105 0.107
(0.101) (0.101) (0.116) (0.114)
Education 0.064 0.055a 0.06 0.053b
(0.094) (0.087) (0.087) (0.082)
Health 0.03 0.032 0.033 0.036
(0.071) (0.075) (0.079) (0.068)
N 2810 1460 1189 529
Food: Grains, cereals, eggs, milk, meat, oil, spices, fruits, vegetable, sweets, beverages, tobacco
Home Improvement: Expenses to upgrade the house
Durables: Jewelry, electronics, vehicles, kitchen appliances
Other: Fuels, apparel, transportation, entertainment, newspapers, magazines, gifts
Education: Books, fees, supplies for school
Health: Doctors visits, expenses on medicines
a and b: at 5 percent significance level difference compared to A
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Table 3.3: Mean for variables by regions
Poverty line Total Income Remittances Prop income Distance KTM Pop Ward N Migrants Prop Malaysia Prop Qatar
Mountain 19850 81867 24892 0.30 507 1213 408 10968 0.16 0.09
Urban Kathmandu 40933 318924 63054 0.20 2 30339 864 78525 0.06 0.07
Urban Hill 19577 242708 68423 0.28 308 8106 480 34937 0.13 0.14
Rural hill east 16551 59603 30819 0.52 625 851 384 17051 0.26 0.20
Rural hill central 18689 102657 51520 0.50 110 1240 480 31151 0.18 0.12
Rural hill west 18428 57062 47778 0.840 254 825 480 40069 0.08 0.14
Rural hill midwest 16355 46112 21494 0.47 536 826 336 19779 0.12 0.07
Rural hill farwest 16355 55351 13698 0.25 865 699 180 23783 0.02 0.01
Urban terai 21133 253709 51122 0.20 438 7440 672 49242 0.15 0.18
Rural terai east 16856 85813 40587 0.47 513 2581 480 55839 0.20 0.23
Rural terai central 17540 112803 39817 0.35 322 1352 480 28914 0.22 0.25
Rural terai west 15998 98832 63966 0.65 275 1999 384 54691 0.12 0.18
Rural terai midwest 17319 83236 41156 0.49 485 3026 240 30095 0.14 0.10
Rural terai farwest 17319 103058 30796 0.30 675 2156 156 53319 0.04 0.02
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Table 3.4: Poverty Status by Remittances type
Not Poor (in percent) Poor (in percent) Total
No Remittance 2,200 (78.29) 610 (21.71) 2810
Domestic 1,243 (85.14) 217 (14.86) 1460
International 994 (83.60) 195 (16.40) 1189
Both 442 (83.55) 87 (16.45) 529
Total 4879 (81.48) 1109 (18.52) 5988
The number in parentheses is row percentage
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Table 3.5: First stage multinomial logit model using Dubin-McFadden
Method
(1) (2) (3)
Domestic International Both
Size of HH -0.047 -0.081 -0.010
(0.044) (0.049) (0.0655)
Head age (25-59) -0.522∗∗∗ -0.722∗∗∗ -1.001∗∗∗
(0.169) (0.207) (0.272)
No. of children 0.031 0.309∗∗∗ 0.209
(0.075) (0.093) (0.111)
Dummy for old -0.455∗∗∗ -0.419∗ -0.499
(0.158) (0.195) (0.260)
Dummy for infant 0.157 0.431∗ 0.317
(0.167) (0.196) (0.248)
Dummy for primary school -0.327 -0.451 0.014∗
(0.268) (0.346) (0.430)
Dummy for secondary school -0.027 -0.445 -0.306
(0.243) (0.332) (0.419)
Dummy for advance education -0.178 -0.485 -0.587
(0.253) (0.337) (0.448)
Urban -1.172∗∗∗ -0.952∗ -1.639∗
(0.386) (0.384) (0.661)
Belongs to Ethnic Caste -0.221 0.336∗ -0.353
(0.130) (0.150) (0.231)
Duration (1-5 years) 0.304 0.545 0.815∗∗
(0.237) (0.212) (0.254)
Duration (Greater than 5 years) 1.489 0.598∗∗ 0.950∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.215) (0.243)
Absentee in the HH 0.650∗∗∗ 2.676∗∗∗ 3.071∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.199) (0.327)
No. of Migrant in district 0.000009∗∗∗ 0.000012∗∗∗ -.000022∗∗∗
(0.000002) (0.000003) (0.000004)
Proportion of migrants in Qatar -2.511∗ 0.497 0.189
(1.104) (0.947) (1.624)
Proportion of migrants in Malaysia 2.345∗∗∗ 0.222 1.277
(0.838) (0.947) (1.424)
Constant -0.187 -1.592∗∗∗ -3.232∗∗∗
(0.403) (0.438) (0.664)
Pseudo R2 18.32%
N 5,988
Standard errors in parentheses. Regional dummies not reported in the table
Base outcome: No Remittances
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Table 3.6: Consolidated coefficients
Food HI Durables Other Education Health
Selection Correction
Type A log of total expenditure -0.178∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.006
(0.01) (0.01) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Type B log of total expenditure -0.210∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.029∗∗∗ -0.007
(0.014) (0.014) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Type C log of total expenditure -0.208∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.011 -0.029∗∗∗ -0.009
(0.013) (0.012) (0.004) (0.01) (0.005)
Type D log of total expenditure -0.187∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ -0.023∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.012
(0.023) (0.024) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
OLS Estimate
Type A log of total expenditure -0.178∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.005
(0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Type B log of total expenditure -0.201∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.027∗∗∗ -0.007
(0.011) (0.011) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Type C log of total expenditure -0.211∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.008 -0.027∗∗∗ -0.011
(0.013) (0.011) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004)
Type D log of total expenditure -0.186∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.014
(0.017) (0.020) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
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Table 3.7: Estimated Marginal Budget Shares of households on expenditure and Average Treatment Effects for remittances
receiving households with parameters from non-remittances household model
MBS NR MBS type Counterfactual ATT
[1] [2] [3] [4]=[2]-[3]
No Remittances vs Domestic
Food 0.4754 0.5391 0.8924 -0.3533
HI 0.2942 0.3205 0.0286 0.2919
Durables 0.0316 0.0606 -0.0369 0.0975
Other 0.0781 0.1179 0.0063 0.1116
Education 0.0775 0.0216 0.0416 -0.02
Health 0.0259 0.0052 0.0293 -0.0241
No Remittances vs International
Food 0.4754 0.4038 0.4442 -0.0404
HI 0.2942 0.153 0.4709 -0.3179
Durables 0.0316 0.1002 0.0449 0.0553
Other 0.0781 0.1755 0.0227 0.1528
Education 0.0775 0.0357 -0.0121 0.0478
Health 0.0259 -0.0682 0.0292 -0.0974
No Remittance vs Both
Food 0.4754 0.3435 0.5825 -0.239
HI 0.2942 0.2979 0.3396 -0.0417
Durables 0.0316 0.008 -0.1378 0.1458
Other 0.0781 0.1312 -0.0043 0.1355
Education 0.0775 0.0764 0.0644 0.012
Health 0.0259 -0.2103 0.1555 -0.3658
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Table 3.8: Oaxaca decomposition: P-values for characteristics, coefficients,
and interactions differences between types of households
Endowments Coefficients Interaction
No Remittances vs Domestic
Food 0.029 0.277 0.092
HI 0.042 0.873 0.618
Durables 0.020 0.263 0.747
Other 0.227 0.06 0.989
Education 0.000 0.059 0.003
Health 0.028 0.07 0.998
No Remittances vs International
Food 0.207 0.000 0.085
HI 0.451 0.678 0.471
Durables 0.975 0.014 0.226
Other 0.127 0.307 0.662
Education 0.042 0.000 0.008
Health 0.209 0.055 0.663
No Remittances vs Both
Food 0.762 0.000 0.042
HI 0.405 0.104 0.487
Durables 0.39 0.000 0.094
Other 0.522 0.208 0.984
Education 0.006 0.001 0.657
Health 0.162 0.019 0.082
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Table 3.9: Multinomial Probit estimate using the Dubin Mcfadden method
for poverty
Poor Poor Poor Poor
[1] [2] [3] [4]
No. of HH member -0.00936 0.0133 0.0116 -0.00161
(0.00895) (0.0143) (0.0208) (0.0208)
Head age 25-59 -0.0523 -0.0239 -0.0542 -0.0694
(0.0493) (0.0510) (0.0764) (0.0758)
Dummy for old -0.0180 -0.00759 -0.0859 -0.0447
(0.0358) (0.0403) (0.0650) (0.0616)
Dummy for infant 0.185∗∗∗ 0.0787 0.111 0.115∗
(0.0279) (0.0560) (0.0673) (0.0488)
Urban -0.114∗∗ -0.113 -0.193 -0.109
(0.0369) (0.0583) (0.100) (0.0874)
Belongs to Ethnic Caste -0.00112 -0.0211 -0.0626 0.00269
(0.0389) (0.0437) (0.0805) (0.0668)
Dummy for primary school -0.0803∗ -0.0993 -0.0889 0.00533
(0.0360) (0.0584) (0.0681) (0.0744)
Dummy for secondary school -0.176∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗ -0.181∗∗ -0.114∗
(0.0297) (0.0406) (0.0574) (0.0549)
Dummy for advance education -0.280∗∗∗ -0.226∗∗ -0.219 -0.159
(0.0734) (0.0821) (0.132) (0.118)
Duration (2-5 years) 0.0235 0.0225 0.0812 0.0455
(0.0652) (0.0704) (0.0866) (0.0604)
Duration (more than 5 years) 0.209 0.136 0.205 0.139
(0.142) (0.156) (0.189) (0.147)
Dummy for Absentee 0.122 0.00464 0.0392 0.163
(0.0974) (0.147) (0.218) (0.207)
λ0 -0.128 0.354 -0.0709 -0.151
(0.257) (1.053) (1.013) (0.817)
λ1 1.109
∗∗ 0.514∗ 1.285 0.819
(0.359) (0.234) (0.753) (0.630)
λ2 -0.0114 0.0470 -0.0572 -0.144
(0.475) (0.586) (0.224) (0.852)
λ3 0.474 0.969 0.938 0.167
(0.784) (1.791) (1.341) (0.258)
Constant 0.669∗∗ -0.0607 0.816 -0.107
(0.211) (0.599) (0.920) (0.463)
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Table 3.10: Probability estimates using Probit and Selection Correction
method at means
No remittances Domestic International Both
Probit 0.165 0.114 0.128 0.128
Selection Corrected 0.217 0.149 0.184 0.164
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CHAPTER 4
IMPACT OF THE POVERTY
ALLEVIATION FUND PROGRAM ON
MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES IN
NEPAL
4.1 Introduction
Migration is a global occurrence. Migration from developing countries is
increasing with individuals aspiring to move abroad. It is mostly common in
economies that have traditionally been agricultural. The agricultural sector
in developing countries acts as a reservoir for excess unskilled or semi-skilled
labor. In the absence of industrial and service sectors, the excess unskilled
and semi-skilled labor are encouraged to seek opportunities in the global la-
bor market that provide substantially higher wages for their skills. A recent
Gallup poll finds 40 percent of adults from the poorest quartile of the coun-
tries want to migrate permanently (Clemens, 2011). The common factors
that are driving migration from the developing world to the developed world
are conflicts, the absence of work opportunities, and higher wages in devel-
oped countries for similar skills.
Migration is one of the most challenging questions facing countries in the
21st century. Developed countries are facing the challenging question of
whether to allow migrants or not because of the fear of migrants taking away
local jobs, receiving social benefits without contributing to the system, among
others. On the other hand, developing countries are facing the challenge of
not being able to retain their workforce, which may be due to conflicts, lack of
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better work opportunities, and low wage for the skill. The issue of migration
is not unique to conflict-affected countries but to most developing countries,
which do not have enough resources and capacity to increase opportunities
for the semi-skilled and low skilled workforce.
Migration is a costly process and has both financial and non-financial com-
ponents that can influence decisions. Financial components include the cost
associated with job search, travel, foregone income due to migration, as well
as income earned and remitted back by migrant workers. Non-financial com-
ponents are the disutility of being away from home, and physical and emo-
tional stress to both family members and migrants at the destination. The
presence of conflicts, work opportunities, job search costs, and ease of travel
requirements can affect both financial and non-financial components asso-
ciated with migration. Most households decide to send migrants based on
the cost-benefit of migration with information available. The major benefits
to the migrant-sending households in the literature are remittances. Remit-
tances are one of the major financial transfers migrants send to their families.
Remittances from developed countries have become higher than foreign direct
investment (FDI) and development aid received by the developing countries
(Ratha, Mohapatra, and Silwal, 2010). However, no consensus on the role
of remittances on household welfare because most of labor-related migration
is short term, and remittances, if not invested in capital formation, can only
facilitate short-term household consumption. For the semi-skilled and un-
skilled labor force in agriculture, lack of local opportunities to utilize their
labor coupled with higher wages in destination countries can be thought of
as the major reasons to migrate. Migration is not only affected by financial
constraints; rather it is determined by various other factors such as family
69
and cultural ties, better work and wage opportunities, and desires to migrate
for better living conditions, among others.
Most of the previous studies have found that relaxation of financial con-
straints has increased domestic migration (Bryan, Chowdhury, and Mobarak,
2014) and international migration (Oliver, 2009; Angelucci, 2013). The stud-
ies have looked at the effect of a transfer to ease financial constraints that
would facilitate migration. A recent paper by Bazzi (2014) shows positive
income shocks triggered by price shocks and positive rainfall increase mi-
gration among small landholders. The relaxation of financial constraints is
likely to increase migration when individuals do not have local opportunities
to work and earn a living.
Instead of sending individuals abroad for income opportunities, what is the
effect of bringing opportunities to people at their origin? Is there a similar
effect on migration with increase in income-generating opportunities locally?
The answer to the question would require a policy intervention to affect not
only the financial constraint but also the existing work-related opportunities.
This paper addresses two important questions related to development pro-
grams and their effects on migration and remittances. What is the effect of
an anti-poverty program that affects both financial constraints and oppor-
tunity costs of households on migration? This question is not addressed in
the literature because relevant policy experiments are not easily available.
I address this important question using randomly phased-in program data
from the Nepal Poverty Alleviation Fund (henceforth PAF). The main goal of
the program is to provide sustainable income-generating activities to house-
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holds in rural and poor communities in Nepal, which were brewing grounds
for the civil conflict that lasted from 1996 to 2006. The income-generating
activities are livestock transfers, better seeds for agriculture, and in some
cases vocational training, which are intended to affect the household bud-
get constraints by providing work opportunities. In addition to relaxing the
budget constraints, the program also affects the opportunity cost of migra-
tion for individuals. The program provides an ideal policy experiment to
understand the effect of relaxed financial constraints and increased opportu-
nity cost of migration. The randomized phased-in program design provides
an ideal setup to understand the role of income-generating activities on mi-
gration. The income-generating activities increase the opportunity cost of
migration, unlike conditional cash transfer programs that only affect the fi-
nancial constraints. Understanding the impact of anti-poverty programs on
migration is useful because most of the countries where such programs are
implemented happen to have a long tradition of international labor migra-
tion (Angelucci, 2013). As most of the migrants from developing countries
tend to be from rural and agricultural households, the impact of the income-
generating activities, implemented in rural and marginalized communities,
on migration can provide good insight into policies related to migration in
developing countries.
The second question is the effect of the anti-poverty programs on private
transfers of households. Cox and Jimenez (1990) show that private transfers
account for a sizable share of household income and expenditures in devel-
oping countries. The income-generating activities can have a direct impact
on economic outcomes of the recipients by creating sustainable employment
opportunities locally. The improvement in income can affect the existing
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private transfers of the program recipient households. As clearly stated by
Cox (1987), from a theoretical perspective, various reasons to expect public
transfers to affect private transfers. However, from an empirical point of
view, it is difficult to assess the presence of the effect due to the absence
of appropriate counterfactual groups (Albarran and Attanasio, 2002). Using
the randomized phased-in design of the program, I assess the effect of the
program on remittances received by the households.
In addition to the indirect effects of the program, this paper analyzes direct
impacts of the program on welfare outcomes such as per capita consump-
tion, per capita food consumption, and a food security measure at various
quantiles. The welfare outcomes are the intended effect of the anti-poverty
program. The increase in direct welfare measure resulting from the program
should provide evidence that the income-generating activities are affecting
the opportunity cost of migration for treated households.
I address these questions using data from the Nepal PAF program. PAF
is a social fund program, which provides income-generating activities to
marginalized communities in Nepal. Social fund programs mainly focus
on a community-driven development approach to identify and implement
the most feasible income-generating activities for the poor and marginalized
population. The main objectives of these income-generating activities are
to increase earning potential, improve food security, provide public support
and create social harmony. Most of these income-generating activities have
short turnover rates that tend to show results faster than human capital
investments and adoption of new technology that requires learning. The im-
provement in household income due to the income-generating activities can
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relax financial constraints for labor migration. Also, remittances from indi-
viduals abroad can facilitate migration. I use the panel data from 6 program
districts of Nepal collected in 2007 and 2010. The data have several advan-
tages. Nepal has a different socio-cultural and migration setting than other
developing countries. Most of the micro-studies performed to date (24 stud-
ies) have used cross-sectional data and 10 of the 24 studies use data from
Mexico (Clemens, 2014). Nepalese labor migration is different from Mexico’s
case as international migrant workers are documented and recorded with
the Department of Labor of the Nepalese Government before they travel for
work.1 Although Nepalese nationals are allowed to work and travel to In-
dia without restriction, the opportunity to work in a third country that can
have better wages has attracted Nepalese workers to choose these destina-
tions. The dataset provides a unique setting to understand labor migration
in the presence of multiple work-related and migration opportunities. Be-
sides, the dataset contains information on both randomly selected treatment
and control groups providing us an ideal setting to understand the effect of
the program on migration and remittances.
I have the following main findings. First, I find an increase in domestic mi-
gration by 11 percent. However, no change in international migration, which
is similar to Stecklov, Winters, Stampini, and Davis (2005) findings.2 The
increase in opportunity among treatment villages has negated the relaxed
financial constraints on international migration. To confirm the results, I
estimate the impacts of the program distinguishing labor-specific migration,
1The international migration referred to in this paper would be to a third country that
requires a passport and travel documents.
2Labor related migration did not increase in contrast to the results in Angelucci (2013)
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and other types of migration. 3 The result suggests that the program has
a statistically significant and positive effect on non-labor-specific migration,
but not on labor-specific migration. The reason behind the result can be
attributed to lower costs and lower risk of domestic migration compared to
international migration. Furthermore, individuals receiving the anti-poverty
program may postpone the relatively risky decision of international migra-
tion with the expectation of returns from the programs. The program also
affects migration by increasing the opportunity cost to a program recipient.
Second, I find a decrease in remittances among program recipients compared
to non-recipients. The results show a decrease of Rs. 6,000, accounting for
six percent of total household consumption, which is consistent with the hy-
pothesis that public transfers crowd out private transfers and aligns with
Jensen (2004) in a pension context. The results show the program is crowd-
ing out remittances, which could relax financial constraints needed by house-
holds for migration. We can infer that households receiving program benefits
have fewer remittances, suggesting the possible substitution effect of remit-
tances from the household budget set by income-generated from the program.
Third, the evidence suggests that the program induced an increase in welfare
measures such as per capita consumption, per capita food consumption and
food-secure months per year. Assessing the program effect at various quan-
tiles shows positive effects of the program at all the distribution levels.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the paper
studies the effects of an anti-poverty program, which not only relaxes the fi-
nancial constraints but also increases the opportunity cost of migration using
3Other types of migration include migration due to marriage, education, family reasons,
and other
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data from an experimental setup. The paper finds no significant increase in
work-related migration when work-related opportunities are increased in the
poor and rural communities in developing countries unlike previous research
that shows an increase in international migration. The results suggest indi-
viduals may not choose to migrate if work-related opportunities are available
locally. Second, the paper tests the hypothesis that PAF, an anti-poverty
program, affects existing private transfers such as remittances in the context
of Nepal. As mentioned earlier, the challenge to assess the effect of the public
transfers on the private transfers is difficult empirically due to the lack of a
proper comparison group. The presence of comparable treatment and control
groups in this dataset provides an ideal setting for causal inference. Also, the
remittances result suggests the program has a positive effect on income as it
crowds out transfers from migrants abroad. Third, the paper contributes to
the effect of the program on actual household welfare measures such as per
capita consumption (food and overall) and food-secure months suggesting
the program increases the household welfare of treatment group.
4.2 Background Context and Establishment of PAF
Nepal is the poorest developing country in South Asia. The population of
Nepal is approximately 30 million. Nepal’s economy has been highly depen-
dent on agriculture, which is the major sector of the economy with 70 percent
of the workforce involved in the sector. Seventy percent of land area in Nepal
consists of hills and high mountains. Fifty percent of the countrys population
lives in these areas and practices subsistence agriculture (Sharma, 2006). The
dependence on subsistence agriculture and decreasing agricultural productiv-
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ity has caused poverty to rise in Nepal in the early 1990s. The condition in
rural Nepal is more severe regarding poverty than in urban Nepal. Rural
Nepal is more deprived of government services and infrastructure (Deraniya-
gala, 2005). According to the Nepal Living Standard Survey (NLSS I), 40
percent of the households were below the poverty line in 1996. The relative
deprivation and poverty in the agricultural communities can have following
outcomes: (1) civil conflict to have control over limited resources (Sharma,
2006; Deraniyagala, 2005; Williams, 2013) and (2) out-migration due to lower
opportunity cost to staying (Angelucci, 2013; Bhandari, 2004).
According to the census of 2011, one in every four households reported at
least one member of their household is absent or living out of the country.
Approximately 2 million individuals are reported to be absent. About 45
percent of absent population is from the age group 15-24 years. Migration
among young adults (aged 18-40) is increasing. There is a large number of
Nepalese immigrants in countries like Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait,
and Malaysia. The majority of Nepalese migrant workers employed in these
countries are either unskilled or semi-skilled laborers, mostly working in con-
struction, manufacturing or domestic jobs. The increasing trend in migration
has led to increased remittances as demonstrated by Figure 4.1. The role of
remittances has become extremely important for the socio-economic develop-
ment of the country as it constitutes 30 percent of national GDP and biggest
source of foreign exchange.
The escalation of civil conflict was possible due to the pro-poor revolu-
tionary agendas, which attracted poor and marginalized communities. The
government responded to address the issues of poor and marginalized com-
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munities along with the support of donor agencies by establishing the PAF
in 2003 that was at the peak of the civil war. PAF is a specially-targeted
program to improve the economic situation of the lower strata of the soci-
ety with particular attention to groups that have been traditionally excluded
from development works due to reasons of gender, ethnicity, caste, and lo-
cation. It is an autonomous, professional organization of the government of
Nepal. Initially established through “Poverty Alleviation Fund Ordinance
2004”, PAF has been governed by the Poverty Alleviation Fund Act since
2006. The Act allows it to implement special and targeted program to bring
poor and marginalized groups into development efforts (The Poverty Allevi-
ation Fund, 2013). PAF focuses on enhancing an area’s potential strength by
direct community involvement. It uses local NGOs, and other private-sector
organizations (Partner Organizations (POs)) to facilitate poor and vulnera-
ble groups in communities to implement the program components. PAF has
partnered with various organizations that are working at the village, district,
and national levels to ensure holistic development intervention to create a vis-
ible impact on poverty reduction. The main interventions implemented by
PAF are (i) income-generating activities (IGA), and (ii) small-scale village
and community infrastructure (The Poverty Alleviation Fund, 2014).
PAF is a social fund program that has been providing various income-
generating activities to marginalized communities of Nepal. Social Fund
programs are designed to place less stress on government line agencies by us-
ing community actors to plan decisions and invest resources. The programs
are approaches adopted by several governments and development agencies in
conflict-affected developing nations(The World Bank, 2006; Wong, 2012). 4
4Afghanistan National Solidarity Program, Angola Social Action Fund, Colombia
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In Nepal, the PAF was established towards the later years of the civil con-
flict. The PAF programs mainly focus on community-driven development
approaches to identify and implement feasible income-generating activities
to poor and marginalized populations with a goal of increasing earning po-
tential, providing public support, and creating social harmony.
There are a large number of districts with rural and poor communities for
the government to provide development assistance programs. However, these
income-generating programs are very expensive programs to implement in all
the districts and communities at once. The limited resources, in a particular
year have allowed the government to randomize the program placement. The
major donor agencies of the PAF program are International Development As-
sociation (IDA) of the World Bank and International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD) (The Poverty Alleviation Fund, 2014).
4.3 Randomization Design and Data
A pure randomized control trial (RCT) is difficult to implement because
the program is targeted to poor and excluded communities. The budget re-
strictions for any particular year and implementation capacity constraints
of particular NGOs allow for a randomized phase-in design, which assigns
certain communities for early phase-in. A two-stage stratified sampling is
adopted. First, six districts representing different geographical regions are
randomly selected from 25 PAF-targeted districts. Second, the sampling
Peace and Development Project, Indonesia Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat,
Kosovo Community Development Fund II Project, Rwanda Decentralization and Com-
munity Development Project, Nepal Poverty Alleviation Fund are few examples of such
programs.
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frame consists of those wards/villages (Primary Sampling Units (PSUs))
in six selected districts that are not yet included but represent a potential
pool to be included in the future because of their poverty ranking (Parajuli,
Acharya, Chaudhury, and Thapa, 2012). Of approximately 1000 potential
villages in six districts, 200 villages are randomly selected for the program.
Initially, 100 villages are randomly assigned to the treatment group while
the remaining 100 villages are randomly assigned to the control group. The
program allocation across each district is based on the district size (num-
ber of wards). The randomization is stratified by district to maintain equal
proportions of treatment and control primary sampling units (PSUs) in each
district. The decision to select one village over another for early phase-in
cannot be enforced by lottery alone as implementation readiness of the com-
munity organizations (COs), geography, socio-economic conditions and other
factors contribute towards inability to comply with random selection. Hence,
the most ready are phased in first.
Potential pitfalls to the complete compliance with the perfect randomiza-
tion may be possible. Potential selection issues can happen at three different
levels: selection of the district, selection of village (PSU), and selection of
households. The districts that are selected for the programs have been iden-
tified so as to target poor and excluded communities. The PAF program was
planned by the government of Nepal along with the donor agencies citing
the need to include poor and excluded communities in development main-
stream to meet the millennium development goals (The Poverty Alleviation
Fund, 2013). There may be systematic targeting rule to target the poor and
excluded communities. With regards to the selection of the villages, the im-
plementation capacity of NGOs involved may have an effect on exogenous
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variation, which is true with any development programs. The third level
of selection can be at the household level. Some households would not like
to participate in the program and some may not be selected by the local
CO’s due to various factors not observable to the researchers. The presence
of imperfect compliance can lead to potential biases in estimates. However,
given migration and remittances are the unintended effect of the program
objective, the paper uses exogenous variation of the program at the village
level to identify the effects.
The PAF intervention is implemented as follows: PAF chooses a partner
organization (PO) -local NGO- in a village in the targeted district.5 The PO’s
village-selection depends on qualitative and quantitative assessments based
on need and feasibility. In the selected village, the PO carries out community
mobilization on possible PAF interventions by inviting households to form
a CO consisting of 25 to 30 households as CO members. The CO proposes
income-generating activities for each household in the CO. PAF evaluates the
income-generating activities proposal, which, if endorsed, is funded through
a grant to the community. Communities establish and regulate a revolving
fund from which households can borrow for their income-generating activi-
ties (The Poverty Alleviation Fund, 2014). Member households implement
the approved income-generating activities. On average, PAF provides 20,000
rupees (US$ 185) per income-generating activities per household.
The data for this study came from PAF and were collected by Center
for Economic Development and Administration (CEDA) of the Tribhuwan
5The details of the program evaluation design are adopted from the World Bank policy
working paper Parajuli, Acharya, Chaudhury, and Thapa (2012)
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University. The baseline survey of this longitudinal data was conducted
in 2007. The baseline involved conducting a census of all households in
200 selected villages, followed by administration of a multi-module detailed
household survey to 15 randomly-sampled households in each village. Overall
3,000 households were surveyed in six districts. The six districts are Rauta-
hat, Rolpa, Dailekh, Doti, Humla and Jumla. The survey questionnaire
was adapted from the Nepal Living Standard Survey (NLSS) and included
detailed information on consumption and income, socio-economic and de-
mographic issues including education, health and nutrition, physical assets,
migration and remittances, employment, social employment, community re-
lationship, voice, and participation. For comparability with the national
household survey-based welfare measures, the PAF survey included a similar
consumption module and followed the same aggregation method. A follow-up
survey was performed in 2010, more than two years after the baseline, which
included the same questionnaires from the baseline survey. In addition, the
follow-up survey gathered information on the actual treatment status (PAF
intervention) and non-treatment (control) at both household and the vil-
lage/PSU level. Twenty-five villages, in which only one household received
the treatment, are dropped from the analysis. In two districts Humla and
Jumla, all the villages received the treatment. Pooling these districts with
the remaining four districts is not appropriate as these districts have limited
or no access to roads. Table 4.1 presents summary statistics and p-values for
mean differences between treatment and control groups of important vari-
ables used in the analysis for the remaining four districts.
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4.4 Identification Strategy
The program is randomly placed in six districts out of 25 PAF targeted
districts representing different geographic regions. I take advantage of the
random program placement to understand the impact of program interven-
tion on remittances and migration in four of the six districts. If migration was
only driven by the financial constraints then increased income from income-
generating activities and transfers from remittances can relax the financial
constraints. The relaxation of financial constraints could result in house-
holds in treatment villages receiving more income, which provides additional
resources to buy food and other household needs or to finance migration
compared to the control households. One of the identifying assumptions is
that in the absence of the program, the households in treatment villages and
control villages would not have significant differences in welfare measures,
remittances, and migration. However, if we see decreases in remittances in
treatment group that would imply the households view the costs of migration
to be greater than the benefits.
To assess the impact of the program, I perform difference-in-differences es-
timates using various outcome variables. To test for the absence of differences
in the baseline, I perform balance tests on remittance recipient status, mi-
grant status, remittance amount, total consumption, and per capita income
among treatment and control villages. Table 4.1 shows the balancing test
for major variables used in the analysis. Proportion of migrants, proportion
of migrants for work, number of adult females, proportion of international
migrant, asset index and total consumption are variables that do not satisfy
the balancing test at 10 percent significance level. Alternatively, a Bonferroni
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multiple comparison correction for 14 independent test requires a significant
threshold α = 0.004 for each test to recover overall significance of 0.05. Using
this criterion, only the number of adult females would be statistically differ-
ent. The t-test for number of adult females in treatment and control group
shows statistically significant difference with p-value of 0.004. Additionally,
the difference-in-differences method controls for the different levels in the es-
timation. Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of remittances among treatment
and control group. The remittances distribution is more spread for control
villages in 2010 while the distribution for treatment villages shows similar
distribution as 2007. Figure 4.3 shows the proportion of migrants between
treatment and control villages across time is increasing comparatively more
in the control villages. The proportion of households receiving remittances
is higher for the control villages as compared to treatment villages. Figure
4.4 demonstrates the proportion.
Yijt = µ+ γDj + piTt + βDjTt + θXijt + eijt (4.1)
where i- household, j- village, t-time.
Equation 4.1 shows the difference-in-differences regression where β is the
variable of interest -the program effect. Next, I estimate the effect of pro-
gram on the welfare measures of households receiving the program. To assess
the impact of the program on per capita consumption, food-secure month,
and per capita food consumption I perform two-stage-least squares estimates.
2SLS can be defined as follows:
First stage equation
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Treatmentjt = θAssignmentjt + piXijt + ωijt (4.2)
Yijt = δ ˆTreatmentjt + βXit + ijt (4.3)
The anti-poverty program can have differential effect across households. In
order to assess the distributional impact, I perform a quantile instrumental
variable approach at (5, 25, 50, 75, 95)th quantile using ivqte in STATA (Fr-
lich and Melly, 2010). I apply the Abadie, Angrist and Imbens approach in
the quantile estimation approach (Abadie, Angrist, and Imbens, 2002). Two
districts Humla and Jumla in the mountainous region of the country have
only treatment villages; I therefore perform before-after treatment to access
the impact of the program 6.
4.5 Results
This section quantifies the impact of the PAF program on the amount of
remittances, whether the household receives remittances, and whether the
household has a migrant. In addition to these indirect effect of the pro-
gram, this section also estimates the distributional effect of the program on
welfare measures. The primary outcome variables used in the analyses are
the amount of remittances, household receiving remittances, and whether
a household member migrated. I employ clustered standard errors at the
primary sampling unit following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004).
6These two districts have very limited access to transportation. The limited access
to roads can have an affect on prices of goods and services, which can further affect the
disposable income of the households.
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I estimate the impact of the program by employing difference-in-differences
estimates. I perform the balance test, reported in Table 4.1, on the aggregate
sample to perform the difference-in-differences estimate. Since two of the six
districts do not have control groups, I perform balance tests for remaining
four districts. Balance tests are valid for amount of remittances, remittances
recipient status, and household migrant status as shown in Table 4.1.
The estimates in Table 4.2 presents two specifications. Column 1 is the
base specification without demographic controls . Column 2 reports the
result for specification with the demographic controls. The demographic
controls used in the analyses are number of adult males, number of adult
females, number of children, household size, and duration of time in months
a migrant has been away. In both specifications, the program decreases re-
mittances by approximately 6000 rupees a year among program participants.
The result shows public transfers crowd out private transfers similar to the
findings in the previous literature. The amount of crowd out is equal to six
percent of total household consumption on average. To understand the im-
pact of the program on domestic and international remittances, I perform the
difference-in-differences by separating the remittances into both domestic and
international remittances. Due to the presence of higher wage differentials in
international labor markets, I would expect higher international remittances
than domestic remittances. There is a statistically significant decrease in
international remittances but no difference in domestic remittances as shown
in Table 4.3.
Table 4.4 shows the effect of program on households receiving remittances.
The program effect is significant at 0.05 level for the specification with no
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demographic controls. There is a six percent decrease in the probability of
household receiving remittances. However, after including the demographic
controls (specification in column 2 of Table 4.4), the program causes a de-
crease in the probability that a household will receive remittances by 4.8 per-
cent, although the estimate is not statistically significant. Table 4.5 presents
the effect of the program on the proportion of migrants in the household.
Column 1 shows the decrease in migrants due to the program effect but it is
not statistically different from zero. Including demographic controls in the
specification (Column 2) shows the change in sign but the estimates are not
statistically different from zero. In addition to the difference-in-differences,
I also perform the two stage least square (2SLS) estimate of the program
on amount of remittances, household with migrants, and household receiv-
ing remittances. Table 4.6 presents the 2SLS effect of the program. 2SLS
estimates for amount of remittances, household receiving remittances, and
household with migrants are not statistically significant showing that there
is no effect of the program on compliers. The 2SLS results indicate that the
always-takers or never-takers are driving the difference-in-differences results
at least for the amount of remittances received. The difference-in-differences
results are relevant considering it shows an average effect for the whole sam-
ple rather than 2SLS estimate, which only focuses on the compliers.
To explore the breakdown by type of migration, I separate the migrants
into domestic and international categories. Domestic migration can be con-
sidered less costly than international migration both emotionally and mon-
etarily. To avoid potential endogeneity, I perform IV estimation of the pro-
gram effects on international and domestic migration. The 2SLS estimate
in Table 4.7 shows an 11.1 percent increase in domestic migrants while the
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probability that the household has at least one international migrants de-
creases, but is not statistically significant. The result can be the short-run
effect of the program as shown by Stecklov, Winters, Stampini, and Davis
(2005) in case of Mexico. Angelucci (2013) using the data from the same pro-
gram shows the Stecklov, Winters, Stampini, and Davis (2005) result might
result from treating both labor related and non-labor migration as same. To
address the pooling issue, I further divide the migration into labor-related
and non-labor related migration and perform the 2SLS estimate. Table 4.8
shows that migration for other reasons besides labor increases by 8 percent
while impact on the labor related migration is not statistically significant7.
The result is consistent with the notion that the increase in the income level
of an extremely poor household helps it to finance job search for the domestic
labor market. Finding work in domestic labor market tends to be relatively
cheaper than finding a job in another country’s labor market. Over time
the domestic labor migration may allow a household to finance international
migration in presence wage differentials in domestic and international labor
market for similar skills. Even for those households that are not extremely
poor, international migration in the context of Nepal is a costly process .
Considering the cost difference of domestic and international migration, the
increase in domestic migration can be associated with households postpon-
ing the costly decision of international migration in the presence of income-
generating activities of PAF.
Next, I assess the average treatment effect of the program on welfare mea-
sures, I perform the intent-to-treat effect of the program on the log of real per
7Migration other includes migration due to education, health, social reasons such as
wedding.
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capita consumption, food sufficiency in months, and log of per capita food
consumption. The program has a positive and statistically significant effect
on welfare measures of the households as shown in the first row of Table 4.9.
Column 1 of Table 4.9 presents the effect of the program on log of per capita
consumption. The program results in a 31 percent increase in per capita con-
sumption. Column 2 shows the effect of program on food-secure months. The
program increases the number of food-secure months by 1.29 months. In case
of per capita food consumption, the program causes an 11.9 percent increase
as shown in column 3. To assess the average treatment effect of the program
on the welfare measures, I perform the difference-in-differences estimates.
The estimates in Table 4.10 shows the effect of the program on welfare. The
program has positive and significant effect on food-secure months while no
significant effect on per capita consumption. The dependent variables do not
satisfy the balancing requirement for the difference in differences analysis.
Considering the anti-poverty program to have a distributional effect, I as-
sess treatment effects at the 5, 25, 50, 75 and 95 quantiles of log of real per
capita consumption, food sufficiency in months, and log of per capita food
consumption. The results of the analyses are presented in Tables 4.11, 4.12,
and 4.13.
Table 4.11 shows significant positive effects of the program on real per
capita consumption ranging from 27 percent to 38 percent. The result is sta-
tistically significant at 25, 50, 75 and 95 quantile of the log of real per capita
consumption distribution. The number of children significantly decreases the
per capita consumption by 10 to 15 percent in the 25 to 95 quantile of con-
sumption distribution. Table 4.12 shows that food-secure months are only
significant at the 25 and 50 quantiles. The program increases the number of
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food-secure month by 1.4 to 2.3 months per year. The demographic controls
are not statistically significant at all the distribution of food-secure months.
For real per capita food consumption, I find positively significant effects at
the 25, 50, and 75 quantiles of food consumption distribution. The per capita
food consumption increases by 11 to 14 percent as shown in Table 4.13. The
number of children decreases the per capita food consumption between 8.6
to 9 percent at all the points of the food consumption distribution. The
results shows the statistically significant welfare effect at the middle of the
consumption distribution and not at the tails of the distribution. The results
shows that the program may not have effects especially at the lower quantile.
For the two remaining districts, Humla and Jumla, I perform before and
after analysis to access the effect of the program because all the villages in
the districts are treatment villages. Table 4.14 shows the before and after
effect of the program on all the variables that were studied in the remain-
ing four districts. The trend in these districts shows the outcome variables
are increasing except for log of real per capita food consumption. Table
4.14 column 3 shows p values for before and after comparison of variables.
Remittances, household receiving remittances recipient and per capita con-
sumptions are statistically different in means before and after treatment.
The results in these districts are different from the remaining four districts
because these two districts have limited access to roads, are more remote,
and have limited information on international migration than remaining four
districts. The number of migrants in the districts before and after treatment
are not significantly different. There is increase in remittances but not at the
same level as the time trend in remaining four districts.
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4.6 Conclusion and Discussion
This paper analyzes the role of an anti-poverty program on migration, pri-
vate transfers, and welfare measures. The findings show the crowd out of
private transfers in the presence of public transfers. The program causes
an increase in domestic migration and no change in international migration
unlike the existing trend of increased international migration in Nepal. The
program has a positive effect on per capita consumption, and food security
measures. The effect is significant at the middle of the welfare distribution.
The program may not have effect especially at the lowest quantile of the
consumption distribution.
This study fills the gap in the literature by investigating the causal impact
of income-generating activities on remittances and migration. Remittances
and migration have vital roles in developing economies. The paper provides
results consistent with short-run behavior as shown by Stecklov, Winters,
Stampini, and Davis (2005) in the case of Mexico. Findings from this paper
can help policymakers understand the role of community-driven development
programs for issues such as youth migration and remittances (distinct from
primary goals such as poverty and nutritional outcomes). It provides future
direction on the research related to migration suggesting the opportunity
story as one of the potential reasons for individuals migration choice.
Most of these programs are placed in conflict-affected countries. The coun-
tries are traditionally agricultural economies with mostly semi-skilled and
unskilled labor force. Such income-generating interventions can create eco-
nomic growth at a local level. Economic growth in the least developing
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countries is likely to increase emigration, as increased income allows people
to afford migration. Increased income also allows households to invest in the
better education of youth. Educated youth are more likely to migrate to
places with better working conditions and higher pay for the same skill-set
of jobs.
Anecdotal evidence from Nepali migrants abroad suggest that international
migration is often a risky process. The issues related to violence against mi-
grants at destination countries, unsafe living and working conditions, breach
of initial contracts related to wage and duties, risk of being incarcerated try-
ing to break the contracts, and loss of the right to return to the home country
without employers’ consent put added risks that can cause potential migrants
to become discouraged from attempting international migration. One of the
factors that drives international labor migration is wage differentials and as-
piration to better life. Having public information about the risk of migration
to popular destination countries can discourage the potential migrants with
regards to international migration, especially among households with relaxed
financial constraints, until credible information concerning jobs are obtained.
The presence of a large number of recruitment agencies in the major cities of
Nepal can motivate potential migrants to move domestically from the rural
villages to obtain information on international migration. Results in this
paper showing the increase in domestic non-labor related migration support
the fact. The time-frame used in the paper can be considered as a short-run
effect of the anti-poverty program. The results are consistent with a post-
ponement of the risky international migration decision in the expectation of
credible information and factoring in the cost-benefit effect of international
migration at the household level.
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Youth involvement is important to the success of most features of community-
driven programs. One of the implications of this analysis is that potential
migrants, if given appropriate income-generating activities, will stay at home.
However, this may be a short-term effect. In the longer run, the programs can
lead to increases in international migration due to wage differentials. The im-
pact of such programs provides a new direction for employment creation and
entrepreneurship at the village level in developing countries. Programs like
PAF can make the households self-sufficient and hence fulfill the main goal
of sustainable poverty alleviation and empowerment of marginalized commu-
nities.
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4.7 Tables and Figures
Figure 4.1: Remittances and migration trend according to Ministry of
Finance of Nepal
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Figure 4.2: Remittances distribution in 2007 and 2010
Figure 4.3: Migrants proportion in 2007 and 2010
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Figure 4.4: Remittances recipient proportion in 2007 and 2010
Figure 4.5: Distribution of asset index
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Table 4.1: Balancing test of variables in baseline in four districts:
Treatment Implementation
(1) (2) (3)
(Mean Control) (Mean Treatment) ( P-value for difference)
Remittances 6433.84 5244.48 0.15
(688.01 ) ( 493.96)
Remittances Recipient 0.18 0.166 0.295
(0.013) (0.011)
Migrants 0.41 0.37 0.085
(0.017) (0.014)
Migration for Work 0.36 0.32 0.075
(0.017) (0.013)
Migration for Other 0.08 0.09 0.358
(0.009) (0.008)
No. Adult Males 1.97 1.90 0.14
(0.04) (0.03)
No. Adult Females 1.90 1.77 0.004
(0.04) (0.03)
No. Children 2.53 2.59 0.39
(0.06) (0.05)
Household Size 5.92 5.80 0.2714
(0.088) (0.073)
Asset Index -0.089 -0.001 0.059
(0.029) (0.033)
Domestic Migrant 0.12 0.13 0.489
(0.011) (0.01)
International Migrant 0.31 0.27 0.051
(0.016) (0.013)
Per cap Income 10294.17 10135.75 0.663
(276.6496 ) (230.7192 )
Total Consumption 75320.01 78891 0.046
( 1296.117) ( 1184.881)
Standard errors in parentheses
Humla and Jumla districts are excluded as all sample villages in the districts were treated.
Asset Index is calculated using data on housing characteristics and land holdings.
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Table 4.2: Difference-in-Differences results on amount of remittances
(1) (2)
Amount of Remittances Amount of Remittances
Time variable 8278.9∗∗∗ 6542.2∗∗∗
(1813.8) (1712.7)
Treatment -1188.1 -797.0
(1014.6) (967.9)
Time X Treatment -6700.5∗∗∗ -6039.3∗∗
(2017.6) (1958.7)
Demographic controls No Yes
Observations 4109 4109
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Controls include : no. of adult males, no. of adult females, no. of children, household size, duration.
Table 4.3: Breakdown of Remittances into international and domestic
(1) (2)
International Remittances Domestic Remittances
Diff in diffs -6650.7∗∗∗ -103.3
(1703.8) (360.2)
Demographic controls Yes Yes
Observations 4109 4109
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Controls include : no. of adult males, no. of adult females, no. of children, household size, duration.
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Table 4.4: Difference-in-Differences results on household receives
remittances
(1) (2)
Household Receives remittances Household Receives remittances
Time variable 0.120∗∗∗ 0.0833∗∗∗
(0.0231) (0.0209)
Treatment -0.0178 -0.0152
(0.0214) (0.0194)
Time X Treatment -0.0661∗ -0.0481
(0.0286) (0.0256)
Demographic controls No Yes
Observations 4109 4109
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Controls include : no. of adult males, no. of adult females, no. of children, household size, duration.
Table 4.5: Difference-in-Differences results on household having migrant
(1) (2)
Household with migrant Household with migrant
Time variable 0.114∗∗∗ 0.0475∗
(0.0285) (0.0194)
Treatment -0.0377 -0.0365∗
(0.0277) (0.0185)
Time X Treatment -0.0347 0.00315
(0.0345) (0.0232)
Demographic controls No Yes
Observations 4109 4109
Standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Controls include : no. of adult males, no. of adult females, no. of children, household size, duration.
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Table 4.6: Two Stage estimator for amount of remittances, household with migrants, and household receiving remittances
(1) (2) (3)
Amount of Remittances Household Receives remittances Household with migrant
Treatment Status -2195.3 -0.0435 0.0333
(2659.9) (0.0388) (0.0454)
No. Adult Males 4100.1∗∗∗ 0.0792∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
(450.7) (0.00658) (0.00769)
No. Adult Females 2275.8∗∗∗ 0.0197∗∗ 0.014
(507.8) (0.00741) (0.00866)
No. Children 207.7 0.00622 -0.00343
(258.6) (0.00377) (0.00441)
Constant -3743.1 0.0293 0.0903∗∗
(1969.2) (0.0287) (0.0336)
Observations 4108 4108 4108
First Stage F-Stat 482.94 482.94 482.94
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Village initial assignment as instrument for treatment
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Table 4.7: Two Stage Least Square Estimates
(1) (2)
International migrant(0,1) Domestic migrant(0,1)
Treatment Status -0.0363 0.111∗∗
(0.0436) (0.0348)
No. Adult Males 0.111∗∗∗ 0.0778∗∗∗
(0.00739) (0.00589)
No. Adult Females 0.00264 0.0265∗∗∗
(0.00833) (0.00664)
No. Children 0.00809 -0.0139∗∗∗
(0.00424) (0.00338)
Constant 0.0881∗∗ -0.0750∗∗
(0.0323) (0.0257)
Observations 4108 4108
First Stage F-Stat 482.94 482.94
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Village initial assignment as instrument for treatment
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Table 4.8: Two Stage Least Square Estimates
(1) (2)
Migration Labor(0,1) Migration Other(0,1)
Treatment Status -0.028 0.08∗∗
(0.0446) (0.0297)
No. Adult Males 0.14∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.00756) (0.005)
No. Adult Females 0.01∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.01)
No. Children 0.01∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003)
Constant 0.08∗∗ -0.08∗∗
(0.03) (0.02)
Observations 4108 4108
First Stage F-Stat 482.94 482.94
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Village initial assignment as instrument for treatment
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Table 4.9: Two Stage Least Square Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Log per capita consumption Food secure months Log per capita food consumption
Treatment 0.311∗∗∗ 1.296∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.0649) (0.347) (0.0356)
No. of Adult Males 0.0656∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.0290∗∗∗
(0.0110) (0.0588) (0.00604)
No. of Adult Females 0.00725 0.373∗∗∗ -0.0151∗
(0.0124) (0.0662) (0.00681)
No. of Children -0.115∗∗∗ -0.0802∗ -0.0887∗∗∗
(0.00631) (0.0337) (0.00347)
Constant 8.573∗∗∗ 6.128∗∗∗ 6.745∗∗∗
(0.0481) (0.257) (0.0264)
Observations 4108 4108 4108
First Stage F-Stat 482.94 482.94 482.94
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Village initial assignment as instrument for treatment
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Table 4.10: Difference in Difference estimate for welfare measures
(1) (2) (3)
Log per capita consumption Food Secure months Log per capita food consumption
Time variable 0.0461 -0.436 -0.0660∗
(0.0405) (0.288) (0.0265)
Treatment 0.162∗∗ -0.750∗∗ 0.0489
(0.0573) (0.274) (0.0386)
Time X Treatment -0.0332 0.906∗∗ -0.0485
(0.0560) (0.340) (0.0363)
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4109 4109 4109
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.11: Quantile instrumental variable estimator for log of per capita consumption
(Q5) (Q25) (Q50) (Q75) (Q95)
log pc cons log pc cons log pc cons log pc cons log pc cons
Treatment 0.226 0.274∗∗∗ 0.327∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.386∗
(0.119) (0.0748) (0.0769) (0.0939) (0.156)
No. Adult Males 0.0234 0.0487 0.0630 0.0919∗ 0.114
(0.0466) (0.0423) (0.0394) (0.0432) (0.0837)
No. Adult Females -0.0275 -0.0304 -0.00649 0.0165 0.00816
(0.0593) (0.0471) (0.0447) (0.0379) (0.0893)
No. of Children -0.0835 -0.100∗∗∗ -0.109∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗
(0.0444) (0.0253) (0.0232) (0.0270) (0.0267)
Constant 7.883∗∗∗ 8.327∗∗∗ 8.620∗∗∗ 9.024∗∗∗ 9.904∗∗∗
(0.162) (0.113) (0.0995) (0.0900) (0.212)
Observations 4108 4108 4108 4108 4108
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.12: Quantile instrumental variable estimator for food security
(Q5) (Q25) (Q50) (Q75) (Q95)
Food secure months Food secure months Food secure months Food secure months Food secure months
Treatment 1 1.417∗ 2.333∗∗∗ 1.000 -3.98e-15
(0.901) (0.604) (0.545) (0.917) (0.0985)
No. of Adult Males 0.352 0.333 0.333 3.61e-16 -4.44e-16
(0.451) (0.350) (0.216) (0.0886) (0.0526)
No. of Adult Females 0.0370 0.333 0.333 -9.95e-17 1.44e-15
(0.383) (0.356) (0.252) (0.101) (0.0537)
No. of Children 0.130 0.0833 4.02e-16 -8.95e-16 -1.55e-15
(0.291) (0.171) (0.152) (0.0492) (0.0323)
Constant 0.481 3.500∗∗∗ 6.000∗∗∗ 11∗∗∗ 12∗∗∗
(1.077) (0.881) (0.681) (0.935) (0.142)
Observations 4108 4108 4108 4108 4108
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.13: Quantile instrumental variable estimator for log of per capita food consumption
(Q5) (Q25) (Q50) (Q75) (Q95)
log pc food cons log pc food cons log pc food cons log pc food cons log pc food cons
Treatment 0.0804 0.105∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.135∗∗ 0.112
(0.0742) (0.0449) (0.0450) (0.0491) (0.0801)
No. of Adult Males 0.0138 0.0119 0.0286 0.0253 0.0647
(0.0339) (0.0200) (0.0215) (0.0280) (0.0543)
No. of Adult Females -0.0326 -0.0167 -0.0220 -0.0224 -0.0374
(0.0496) (0.0257) (0.0216) (0.0289) (0.0550)
No. of Children -0.0912∗∗∗ -0.0898∗∗∗ -0.0887∗∗∗ -0.0872∗∗∗ -0.0865∗∗
(0.0263) (0.0144) (0.0160) (0.0169) (0.0296)
Constant 6.294∗∗∗ 6.583∗∗∗ 6.784∗∗∗ 7.014∗∗∗ 7.342∗∗∗
(0.0921) (0.0661) (0.0631) (0.0756) (0.116)
Observations 4108 4108 4108 4108 4108
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.14: Before-After analysis for Jumla and Humla Districts
(1) (2) (3)
(Mean Before Treatment) (Mean After Treatment) (p values for difference)
Remittances(Rs) 408.25 1707.90 0.01
(122.56 ) (495.31)
Remittances Recipient 0.026 0.06 0.005
(0.007) (0.01)
Migrants 0.244 0.286 0.11
(0.018) (0.019)
Per capita cons. (log) 8.56 8.88 0.00
(0.024) (0.028)
Food secure(months) 8.11 8.20 0.56
(0.12) (0.11)
Per capita food cons. (log) 6.91 6.87 0.20
(0.017) (0.02)
Standard errors in parentheses
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR
CHAPTER 2
The maximization problem shown in equation 1 subject to 2, 3 and 4 are
as follows:
maxU(C, Tm− hm, Tf − hf ;A) subject to
C = pQ(Lm,Lf, z;F )− pzz + wmMm + wfMf + Y + V (Nm, Nf ;K)
FOC:
∂Uc
∂C
= λ
∂ULi
∂Li
= λp
∂Q
∂Li
MPL ≡
∂ULi
∂Li
∂Uc
∂C
= p
∂Q
∂Li
≡ w∗i
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APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR
CHAPTER 3
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Table B.1: Second stage expenditure estimates for Household receiving no
remittances
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
food housing durable other education health
log of total expenditure -0.178∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
No. of HH member -0.000 -0.023∗∗∗ 0.001 0.009∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Head age 25-59 -0.030 0.002 -0.007 0.025∗ 0.024∗∗ -0.014
(0.022) (0.019) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009)
Dummy for old -0.012 0.019 -0.025∗∗ 0.016 -0.007 0.009
(0.021) (0.019) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008)
Dummy for infant 0.042∗ 0.029 0.008 -0.037∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ 0.015
(0.020) (0.016) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007)
Urban -0.089∗ 0.007 0.042 0.039 0.051∗∗ -0.05
(0.036) (0.041) (0.025) (0.020) (0.016)
Belongs to Ethnic Caste -0.017 0.028 -0.013 0.009 -0.012 0.005
(0.016) (0.015) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007)
Dummy for primary school 0.021 -0.016 0.026 0.008 -0.057 0.018
(0.046) (0.080) (0.044) (0.028) (0.044)
Dummy for secondary school 0.002 -0.060 0.053 0.045 -0.045 0.005
(0.047) (0.076) (0.043) (0.027) (0.043)
Dummy for advance education 0.000 -0.145 0.081 0.049 0.000 0.015
(0.048) (0.076) (0.042) (0.027) (0.043)
Duration (1-5years) 0.020 -0.017 -0.019 0.024 -0.005 -0.003
(0.054) (0.062) (0.030) (0.025) (0.016)
Duration (more than 5 years) 0.083 -0.022 -0.047∗ 0.005 -0.014 -0.005
(0.048) (0.049) (0.024) (0.026) (0.018)
Dummy for Absentee 0.031 0.055 -0.015 -0.029 -0.055∗∗ 0.013
(0.039) (0.039) (0.023) (0.025) (0.018)
λ0 -0.099 0.042 0.011 0.018 0.022 0.006
(0.069) (0.102) (0.037) (0.035) (0.023)
λ1 0.266
∗ -0.169 -0.055 -0.050 -0.020 0.028
(0.122) (0.135) (0.061) (0.058) (0.043)
λ2 -0.092 0.200 0.002 -0.042 -0.069 0.001
(0.128) (0.144) (0.071) (0.077) (0.044)
λ3 0.025 0.071 -0.120 -0.054 -0.004 0.082
(0.203) (0.202) (0.109) (0.083) (0.064)
Constant 2.593∗∗∗ -2.533∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.116∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.133
(0.114) (0.149) (0.062) (0.049) (0.059)
Standard errors in parentheses with 100 bootstrapped repetitions
Regional dummies, variables over expenditures are not included in the table
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.2: Second stage expenditure estimates for Household receiving
domestic remittances
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
food housing durable other edu health
log of total expenditure -0.210∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.007 -0.029∗∗∗ -0.007
(0.014) (0.014) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
No. of HH 0.008 -0.026∗∗∗ 0.004 0.011∗∗ 0.001 0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Head age 25-59 -0.022 0.033 0.015 -0.009 -0.015 -0.002
(0.027) (0.024) (0.013) (0.022) (0.014)
Dummy for Old 0.026 0.057∗ -0.023 -0.042∗ -0.024 0.006
(0.026) (0.027) (0.014) (0.018) (0.013)
Dummy for infant -0.016 0.064∗ 0.014 -0.031 -0.015 -0.016
(0.032) (0.028) (0.013) (0.017) (0.013)
Urban 0.003 -0.102∗∗ 0.024 -0.052 0.015 0.112
(0.059) (0.035) (0.027) (0.045) (0.033)
Belongs to Ethnic caste -0.019 0.052∗ -0.010 -0.025 -0.026∗∗ 0.028
(0.024) (0.023) (0.014) (0.015) (0.009)
Dummy for primary school -0.064 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.049
(0.056) (0.037) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020)
Dummy for secondary school -0.064 -0.069 0.038 0.036 0.024 0.035
(0.061) (0.044) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023)
Dummy for advance education -0.060 -0.127∗∗ 0.054∗ 0.046 0.064∗∗ 0.023
(0.053) (0.042) (0.021) (0.026) (0.020)
Duration (1-5years) 0.036 0.031 -0.016 -0.013 -0.014 -0.024
(0.040) (0.037) (0.023) (0.020) (0.011)
Duration (more than 5 years) -0.040 -0.039 0.000 0.050 0.001 0.028
(0.049) (0.038) (0.031) (0.033) (0.017)
Dummy for Absentee -0.070 0.064 0.017 0.045 -0.042 -0.014
(0.064) (0.040) (0.031) (0.040) (0.025)
λ0 0.231 0.091 -0.126 -0.155 0.047 -0.088
(0.165) (0.111) (0.118) (0.094) (0.065)
λ1 0.018 -0.038 -0.029 0.048 0.022 -0.021
(0.050) (0.043) (0.024) (0.031) (0.026)
λ2 -0.087 0.176 0.009 -0.032 -0.071 0.005
(0.163) (0.111) (0.087) (0.126) (0.070)
λ3 0.144 -0.017 -0.125 0.065 0.048 -0.115
(0.179) (0.122) (0.139) (0.123) (0.086)
Constant 2.980∗∗∗ -2.762∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.071 0.378∗∗∗ -0.068
(0.205) (0.148) (0.096) (0.115) (0.074)
Standard errors in parentheses with 100 bootstrapped repetitions
Regional dummies, variables over expenditures are not included in the table
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.3: Second stage expenditure estimates for Household receiving
international remittances
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
food housing durable other edu health
log of total expenditure -0.209∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.011 -0.029∗∗∗ -0.008
(0.013) (0.012) (0.004) (0.009) (0.005)
No. of HH 0.014∗ -0.026∗∗∗ 0.002 0.012∗ -0.000 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Head age 25-59 -0.001 0.016 -0.026 0.003 0.007 0.001
(0.035) (0.033) (0.020) (0.025) (0.022)
Dummy for old 0.034 -0.007 -0.022 0.006 -0.013 0.002
(0.032) (0.029) (0.018) (0.020) (0.014)
Dummy for infant 0.014 0.031 0.009 -0.047∗ -0.011 0.004
(0.028) (0.026) (0.021) (0.022) (0.012)
Urban -0.005 -0.120∗∗ 0.071∗ 0.033 -0.005 0.026
(0.062) (0.037) (0.031) (0.039) (0.037)
Belongs to Ethnic Caste -0.032 0.019 0.040∗ -0.008 -0.020 0.001
(0.029) (0.026) (0.019) (0.024) (0.016)
Dummy for primary school 0.080 0.104 -0.050 -0.067 0.030 -0.097
(0.058) (0.078) (0.030) (0.052) (0.047)
Dummy for secondary school 0.009 0.108 -0.022 -0.043 0.055 -0.107
(0.056) (0.080) (0.030) (0.050) (0.047)
Dummy for advance education 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.089 -0.089
(0.048) (0.076) (0.029) (0.050) (0.047)
Duration (1-5 years) 0.015 0.013 0.013 -0.041∗ -0.010 0.01
(0.029) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018) (0.014)
Duration (more than 5 years) 0.108∗ -0.013 -0.016 -0.062∗ -0.009 -0.008
(0.044) (0.033) (0.022) (0.024) (0.020)
Dummy for Absentee -0.038 -0.118 0.030 0.085 0.008 0.033
(0.076) (0.064) (0.049) (0.047) (0.042)
λ0 -0.333
∗ 0.020 0.028 0.089 0.154 0.042
(0.157) (0.135) (0.130) (0.107) (0.080)
λ1 0.100 -0.097 -0.081 -0.048 0.136 -0.01
(0.154) (0.126) (0.086) (0.098) (0.073)
λ2 -0.116 -0.117
∗ 0.063 0.086∗ 0.042 0.042
(0.060) (0.048) (0.034) (0.040) (0.040)
λ3 0.006 -0.039 -0.106 -0.011 0.088 0.062
(0.156) (0.138) (0.120) (0.118) (0.094)
Constant 2.686∗∗∗ -2.775∗∗∗ 0.305∗ 0.158 0.447∗∗∗ 0.179
(0.212) (0.217) (0.144) (0.145) (0.127)
Standard errors in parentheses with 100 bootstrapped repetitions
Regional dummies, variables over expenditures are not included in the table
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.4: Second stage expenditure estimates for Household receiving
both internal and international remittances
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
food housing durable other edu health
log of total expenditure -0.187∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ -0.023∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.013
(0.023) (0.024) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
No. of HH member 0.009 -0.021 0.000 0.009 0.002 0.001
(0.011) (0.012) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
Head age 25-59 -0.059 0.021 0.025 -0.029 0.019 0.023
(0.058) (0.056) (0.027) (0.039) (0.038)
Dummy for old -0.003 0.026 -0.014 -0.017 -0.016 0.024
(0.054) (0.053) (0.025) (0.041) (0.033)
Dummy for infant 0.038 0.038 0.012 -0.055 -0.029 -0.004
(0.058) (0.051) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026)
Urban 0.108 -0.196∗ 0.110 -0.006 0.132∗ -0.148
(0.134) (0.082) (0.056) (0.056) (0.067)
Belongs to Ethnic Caste -0.039 0.050 0.016 -0.063 0.029 0.007
(0.055) (0.062) (0.029) (0.039) (0.037)
Dummy for primary school 0.074 0.074 0.000 -0.021 0.000 -0.127
(0.072) (0.082) (0.040) (0.044) (0.041)
Dummy for secondary school 0.026 0.054 0.061 -0.009 -0.009 -0.123
(0.079) (0.078) (0.047) (0.044) (0.037)
Dummy for advance education 0.010 0.000 0.090 0.000 0.035 -0.135
(0.082) (0.077) (0.047) (0.050) (0.041)
Duration (1-5 years) 0.020 -0.011 -0.010 0.025 -0.013 -0.011
(0.042) (0.047) (0.024) (0.034) (0.027)
Duration (more than 5 years) 0.017 -0.022 -0.003 0.043 0.006 -0.041
(0.073) (0.058) (0.033) (0.048) (0.029)
Dummy for absentee -0.019 0.011 -0.070 0.074 -0.061 0.065
(0.135) (0.103) (0.061) (0.081) (0.077)
λ0 -0.014 0.154 -0.027 -0.093 -0.061 0.041
(0.307) (0.264) (0.152) (0.231) (0.209)
λ1 0.144 -0.164 0.131 0.022 -0.098 -0.035
(0.268) (0.188) (0.117) (0.136) (0.130)
λ2 -0.404 0.249 -0.010 0.020 0.044 0.101
(0.304) (0.233) (0.135) (0.197) (0.180)
λ3 0.180 -0.045 -0.086 0.045 -0.085 -0.009
(0.113) (0.086) (0.047) (0.068) (0.059)
Constant 2.080∗∗∗ -2.889∗∗∗ 0.716∗∗∗ 0.303 0.500∗∗ 0.29
(0.377) (0.356) (0.174) (0.197) (0.191)
Standard errors in parentheses with 100 bootstrapped repetitions
Regional dummies, variables over expenditures are not included in the table
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.5: OLS expenditure estimates for households with no remittances
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
food housing durable other edu health
log of total expenditure -0.178∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.005
(0.009) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
No. of HH member 0.003 -0.024∗∗∗ 0.001 0.008∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Head age 25-59 0.015 -0.033∗ -0.003 0.013 0.019∗∗ -0.011
(0.014) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007)
Dummy for old 0.030∗ -0.024 -0.016∗ 0.006 -0.008 0.012
(0.012) (0.013) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006)
Dummy for infant 0.038∗∗ 0.026 0.007 -0.033∗∗∗ -0.053∗∗∗ 0.015
(0.014) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
Urban -0.063∗∗ -0.030 0.039∗∗ 0.010 0.033∗∗ 0.011
(0.023) (0.024) (0.015) (0.017) (0.012)
Belongs to Ethnic Caste 0.011 -0.004 -0.010 0.005 -0.008 0.006
(0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Dummy for primary school -0.029 -0.044 0.038∗∗ 0.003 0.027∗∗ 0.005
(0.029) (0.026) (0.013) (0.016) (0.008)
Dummy for secondary school -0.066∗ -0.081∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.042∗ 0.042∗∗∗ -0.005
(0.027) (0.025) (0.013) (0.017) (0.009)
Dummy for advance education -0.061∗ -0.168∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.044∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.029) (0.028) (0.015) (0.018) (0.010)
Duration (1-5 years) 0.003 -0.019 -0.011 0.031 0.000 -0.004
(0.027) (0.028) (0.017) (0.022) (0.016)
Duration (more than 5 years) -0.013 0.024 -0.023 0.021 -0.002 -0.007
(0.023) (0.025) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011)
Dummy for Absentee 0.012 -0.007 0.012 0.001 -0.020∗∗ 0.002
(0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007)
Constant 2.387∗∗∗ -2.298∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.083
(0.086) (0.082) (0.040) (0.036) (0.029)
Standard errors in parentheses with 100 bootstrapped repetitions
Regional dummies, variables over expenditures are not included in the table
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.6: OLS expenditure estimates for households with domestic
remittances
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
food housing durable other edu health
log of total expenditure -0.201∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.027∗∗∗ -0.007
(0.011) (0.011) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
No. of HH member 0.004 -0.026∗∗∗ 0.005 0.013∗∗∗ 0.001 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Head age 25-59 -0.015 -0.013 0.028∗∗ 0.013 -0.013 0.00
(0.019) (0.018) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009)
Dummy for old 0.044∗∗ 0.001 -0.007 -0.026∗ -0.019∗∗ 0.007
(0.017) (0.018) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007)
Dummy for infant -0.001 0.056∗ 0.011 -0.037∗∗ -0.011 -0.018
(0.022) (0.022) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009)
Urban -0.019 -0.167∗∗∗ 0.035∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.017
(0.030) (0.026) (0.018) (0.015) (0.020)
Belongs to Ethnic Caste 0.011 -0.001 -0.009 -0.010 -0.014 0.023
(0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007)
Dummy for primary school -0.048 -0.063∗ 0.039∗ 0.015 0.028∗∗ 0.029
(0.035) (0.031) (0.016) (0.020) (0.010)
Dummy for secondary school -0.040 -0.119∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.040 0.050∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.034) (0.032) (0.015) (0.021) (0.012)
Dummy for advance education -0.031 -0.187∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ -0.006
(0.033) (0.031) (0.015) (0.021) (0.013)
Duration (1-5 years) 0.046 0.033 -0.018 -0.026 -0.010 -0.025
(0.030) (0.033) (0.014) (0.014) (0.009)
Duration (more than 5 years) -0.022 0.007 -0.004 0.001 -0.007 0.025
(0.022) (0.023) (0.012) (0.014) (0.008)
Dummy for absentee 0.001 0.018 0.004 0.009 -0.012 -0.02
(0.018) (0.019) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008)
Constant 2.702∗∗∗ -2.538∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.090 0.293∗∗∗ 0.088
(0.114) (0.106) (0.044) (0.050) (0.037)
Standard errors in parentheses with 100 bootstrapped repetitions
Regional dummies, variables over expenditures are not included in the table
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.7: OLS expenditure estimates for households with international
remittances
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
food housing durable other edu health
log of total expenditure -0.211∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.008 -0.027∗∗∗ -0.011
(0.013) (0.011) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004)
No. of HH member 0.015∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ 0.003 0.013∗∗ -0.001 -0.001
(0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002)
Head age 25-59 0.032 -0.026 -0.025∗ 0.004 0.010 0.005
(0.021) (0.024) (0.012) (0.017) (0.011)
Dummy for old 0.061∗∗ -0.043∗ -0.018 0.007 -0.012 0.005
(0.021) (0.022) (0.011) (0.015) (0.010)
Dummy for infant 0.018 0.044 0.004 -0.055∗∗ -0.008 -0.003
(0.022) (0.023) (0.014) (0.018) (0.009)
Urban 0.002 -0.118∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.027 0.028 -0.005
(0.030) (0.030) (0.017) (0.025) (0.017)
Belongs to Ethnic Caste -0.005 0.025 0.021 -0.027 -0.013 -0.001
(0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.016) (0.010)
Dummy for primary school 0.023 -0.096∗∗ 0.011 0.028 0.034∗∗ 0.00
(0.036) (0.033) (0.017) (0.019) (0.010)
Dummy for secondary school -0.059 -0.083∗∗ 0.038∗ 0.054∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ -0.006
(0.033) (0.032) (0.017) (0.019) (0.011)
Dummy for advance education -0.058 -0.192∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.034) (0.036) (0.019) (0.025) (0.014)
Duration (1-5 years) -0.005 0.018 0.018 -0.038∗∗ -0.001 0.008
(0.022) (0.020) (0.012) (0.015) (0.009)
Duration (more than 5 years) 0.021 -0.008 0.014 -0.027 -0.005 0.005
(0.021) (0.022) (0.012) (0.017) (0.010)
Dummy for Absentee -0.017 -0.019 -0.001 0.027 0.010 0.000
(0.022) (0.021) (0.014) (0.017) (0.011)
Constant 2.671∗∗∗ -2.647∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.168∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.164
(0.140) (0.114) (0.052) (0.075) (0.043)
Standard errors in parentheses with 100 bootstrapped repetitions
Regional dummies, variables over expenditures are not included in the table
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table B.8: OLS expenditure estimates for households with domestic and
international remittances
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
food housing durable other edu health
log of total expenditure -0.186∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.014
(0.017) (0.020) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
No. of HH member 0.004 -0.019∗ 0.001 0.009 0.003 0.002
(0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003)
Head age 25-59 -0.018 -0.020 0.010 0.005 0.009 0.014
(0.035) (0.032) (0.016) (0.024) (0.017)
Dummy for old 0.017 -0.014 -0.010 0.007 -0.018 0.018
(0.037) (0.035) (0.014) (0.029) (0.014)
Dummy for infant 0.049 0.021 0.019 -0.058∗ -0.027∗ -0.004
(0.032) (0.036) (0.016) (0.024) (0.013)
Urban -0.039 -0.217∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ -0.031 0.139∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.056) (0.047) (0.031) (0.043) (0.032)
Belongs to Ethnic Caste 0.042 -0.018 0.013 -0.044 0.008 -0.001
(0.026) (0.029) (0.013) (0.023) (0.013)
Dummy for primary school 0.031 -0.072 0.025 0.002 0.038∗ -0.024
(0.057) (0.058) (0.022) (0.042) (0.019)
Dummy for secondary school 0.002 -0.091 0.063∗∗ 0.022 0.022 -0.018
(0.050) (0.050) (0.020) (0.040) (0.016)
Dummy for advance education 0.008 -0.164∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.037 0.058∗∗ -0.028
(0.047) (0.047) (0.021) (0.042) (0.018)
Duration (1-5 years) -0.013 0.005 0.011 0.008 -0.001 -0.01
(0.028) (0.032) (0.016) (0.025) (0.011)
Duration ( more than 5 years) -0.050 0.043 -0.019 0.026 0.023 -0.023
(0.029) (0.034) (0.015) (0.024) (0.014)
Dummy for absentee -0.050 -0.026 0.027 0.015 -0.016 0.05
(0.039) (0.031) (0.024) (0.028) (0.018)
Constant 2.467∗∗∗ -2.749∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗ 0.15
(0.190) (0.204) (0.069) (0.093) (0.071)
Standard errors in parentheses with 100 bootstrapped repetitions
Regional dummies, variables over expenditures are not included in the table
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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APPENDIX C
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR
CHAPTER 4
The asset index in this paper is constructed using the principle compo-
nent approach using the assets owned by the households. Figure 4.5 shows
the distribution of constructed asset index used in the analysis. I follow
Vyas and Kumaranayake (2006); McKenzie (2005); Houweling, Kunst, and
Mackenbach (2003); Filmer and Pritchett (2001, 1999) approach to create
socio-economic status variable in the absence of accurate income data in the
surveys. Filmer and Pritchett (1999) shows that asset index helps predict
socio-economic difference in the context of Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Nepal,
and Argentina. To construct the asset index I characterize the household as-
sets in the survey into five different categories: Basic, Medium, Professional,
Expensive, and Agricultural assets. I use the count of assets in these cate-
gories to construct the asset index. Filmer and Pritchett (2001) used mostly
binary variables to construct the asset index. However, non-binary variables
can also be included in the analysis (McKenzie, 2005). Basic categories of
assets include bed, chair, table, watch, fan, telephone, radio, closet. Medium
assets include television, VCR, refrigerator, bicycle, camera, rice cooker. Pro-
fessional assets include sewing machine, carts, carpet weaving machine, bul-
lock cart, bicycle rickshaw, horse carts. Expensive assets include motorbike,
tractor, car, bus, and solar panel. Agricultural assets include water pump,
stone grinder, and modern plough.
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C.1 Maps
Figure C.1: Physical Map of Nepal
Figure C.2: District Map of Nepal
119
REFERENCES
Abadie, A., J. Angrist, and G. Imbens (2002): “Instrumental Variables
Estimates of the Effect of Subsidized Training on the Quantiles of Trainee
Earnings,” Econometrica, 70(1), 91–117.
Abdih, Y., R. Chami, J. Dagher, and P. Montiel (2012): “Remit-
tances and Institutions: Are Remittances a Curse?,” World Development,
40(4), 657–666.
Abdulai, A., and P. P. Regmi (2000): “Estimating labor supply of farm
households under nonseparability: empirical evidence from Nepal,” Agri-
cultural Economics, 22(3), 309–320.
Adams, R. H., and A. Cuecuecha (2010): “Remittances, Household
Expenditure and Investment in Guatemala,” World Development, 38(11),
1626–1641.
(2013): “The Impact of Remittances on Investment and Poverty in
Ghana,” World Development, 50(C), 24–40.
Albarran, P., and O. P. Attanasio (2002): “Do Public Transfers Crowd
Out Private Transfers? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mex-
ico,” Working Paper Series UNU-WIDER Research Paper, World Institute
for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
Aly, H., andM. Shields (2010): “Gender and Agricultural Productivity in
a Surplus Labor, Traditional Economy: Empirical Evidence From Nepal,”
The Journal of Developing Areas, 43, 111–124.
Angelucci, M. (2013): “Migration and Financial Constraints: Evidence
from Mexico,” IZA Discussion Papers 7726, Institute for the Study of
Labor (IZA).
Bardhan, P., and C. Udry (1999): Development Microeconomics, no.
9780198773719 in OUP Catalogue. Oxford University Press.
Barham, B., and S. Boucher (1998): “Migration, remittances, and in-
equality: estimating the net effects of migration on income distribution,”
Journal of Development Economics, 55(2), 307–331.
120
Barrett, C. B., S. M. Sherlund, and A. A. Adesina (2008): “Shadow
wages, allocative inefficiency, and labor supply in smallholder agriculture,”
Agricultural Economics, 38(1), 21–34.
Bazzi, S. (2014): “Wealth Heterogeneity and the Income Elasticity of Mi-
gration,” .
Benjamin, D. (1992): “Household Composition, Labor Markets, and La-
bor Demand: Testing for Separation in Agricultural Household Models,”
Econometrica, 60(2), 287–322.
Bertrand, M., E. Duflo, and S. Mullainathan (2004): “How Much
Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?,” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, MIT Press, 119(1), 249–275.
Bhandari, P. (2004): “Relative Deprivation and Migration in an Agricul-
tural Setting of Nepal,” Population and Environment, 25(5), 475–499.
Bourguignon, F., M. Fournier, and M. Gurgand (2007): “Selection
Bias Corrections Based On The Multinomial Logit Model: Monte Carlo
Comparisons,” Journal of Economic Surveys, 21(1), 174–205.
Bourguignon, F., M. Gurgand, and M. Fournier (2002): “SELM-
LOG: Stata module to perform selection bias correction based on the
multinomial logit model,” .
Bryan, G., S. Chowdhury, and A. M. Mobarak (2014): “Underin-
vestment in a Profitable Technology: The Case of Seasonal Migration in
Bangladesh,” Econometrica, 82(5), 1671–1748.
Buckley, C., and E. T. Hoffman (2012): “Are Remittances an Effec-
tive Mechanism for Development? Evidence from Tajikistan, 19992007,”
Journal of Development Studies, 48, 1121–1138.
Carter, M. R., and Y. Yao (2002): “Local versus Global Separability
in Agricultural Household Models: The Factor Price Equalization Effect
of Land Transfer Rights,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
84(3), 702–715.
Castles, S., and M. J. Miller (2009): The Age of Migration: Interna-
tional Population Movements in the Modern World. Palgrave MacMillan.
Chiwuzulum Odozi, J., T. Taiwo Awoyemi, and B. T. Omonona
(2010): “Household poverty and inequality: the implication of migrants
remittances in Nigeria,” Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 13(2), 191–
199.
Clemens, M. (2014): “Does Development Reduce Migration?,” Discussion
Paper 8592, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
121
Clemens, M. A. (2011): “Economics and Emigration: Trillion-Dollar Bills
on the Sidewalk?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(3), 83–106.
Cox, D. (1987): “Motives for Private Income Transfers,” Journal of Political
Economy, 95(3), 508–46.
Cox, D., and E. Jimenez (1990): “Achieving Social Objectives through
Private Transfers: A Review,” World Bank Research Observer, 5(2), 205–
18.
de la Briere, B., E. Sadoulet, A. de Janvry, and S. Lambert
(2002): “The roles of destination, gender, and household composition in
explaining remittances: an analysis for the Dominican Sierra,” Journal of
Development Economics, 68(2), 309–328.
Deraniyagala, S. (2005): “The Political Economy of Civil Conflict in
Nepal,” Oxford Development Studies, 33(1), 47–62.
Dubin, J. A., and D. L. McFadden (1984): “An Econometric Analysis of
Residential Electric Appliance Holdings and Consumption,” Econometrica,
52(2), 345–62.
Filmer, D., and L. Pritchett (1999): “The Effect of Household Wealth
on Educational Attainment: Evidence from 35 Countries.,” Population and
Development Review, 25, 85–120.
(2001): “Estimating wealth effects without expenditure data- or
tears: an application to educational enrollments in states in India,” De-
mography, 38, 115–132.
Frlich, M., and B. Melly (2010): “Estimation of quantile treatment
effects with Stata,” Stata Journal, 10, 423–457.
Gibson, J., D. McKenzie, and S. Stillman (2010): “Accounting for
selectivity and duration-dependent heterogeneity when estimating the im-
pact of emigration on incomes and poverty in sending areas,” Policy Re-
search Working Paper Series 5268, The World Bank.
Glytsos, N. P. (2002): “The Role of Migrant Remittances in Development:
Evidence from Mediterranean Countries,” International Migration, 40(1),
5–26.
Hanoch, G. (1965): “Backward-bending” Supply of Labor,” The Journal
of Political Economy, 73, 636–644.
Haughton, J. H., and S. R. Khandker (2009): Handbook on Poverty
and Inequality. The World Bank.
122
Houweling, T., A. Kunst, and J. Mackenbach (2003): “Measuring
health inequality among chichild in developing countries: does the choice
of the indicator of economic status matter?,” International Journal for
Equality in Health, pp. 1–12.
Huang, Y. (1976): “Backward-bending Supply Curves and Behaviour of
Subsistence Farmers,” The Journal of Development Studies, 12:3, 191–211.
Jacoby, H. G. (1993): “Shadow Wages and Peasant Family Labour Supply:
An Econometric Application to the Peruvian Sierra,” Review of Economic
Studies, 60(4), 903–21.
Jensen, R. T. (2004): “Do private transfers ’displace’ the benefits of public
transfers? Evidence from South Africa,” Journal of Public Economics,
88(1-2), 89–112.
Jimenez-Soto, E. V., and R. P. Brown (2012): “Assessing the Poverty
Impacts of Migrants’ Remittances Using Propensity Score Matching: The
Case of Tonga*,” Economic Record, 88(282), 425–439.
Kapur, D., and J. McHale (2005): Give Us Your Best and Brightest: The
Global Hunt for Talent and Its Impact on the Developing World. Center
for Global Development.
Laderchi, C. R., R. Saith, and F. Stewart (2003): “Does it Matter
that we do not Agree on the Definition of Poverty? A Comparison of Four
Approaches.,” Oxford Development Studies, 31(3), 243.
Le, K. T. (2009): “Shadow Wages and Shadow Income in Farmers Labor
Supply Functions,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 91(3),
685–696.
(2010): “Separation Hypothesis Tests in the Agricultural Household
Model,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 92(5), 1420–1431.
Lechner, M. (2002): “Some practical issues in the evaluation of heteroge-
neous labour market programmes by matching methods,” Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society, 165, 59–82.
Lokshin, M., M. Bontch-Osmolovski, and E. Glinskaya (2007):
“Work-related migration and poverty reduction in Nepal,” Policy Research
Working Paper Series 4231, The World Bank.
McKenzie, D. (2005): “Measuring inequality with asset indicators,” Jour-
nal of Population Economics, 18(2), 229–260.
Mckenzie, D., and H. Rapoport (2007): “Network effects and the dy-
namics of migration and inequality: Theory and evidence from Mexico,”
Journal of Development Economics, 84(1), 1 – 24.
123
McKenzie, D., and H. Rapoport (2010): “Self-Selection Patterns in
Mexico-U.S. Migration: The Role of Migration,” The Review of Economics
and Statistics, 92(4), 811–821.
Milligan, M. A. (2009): “The Welfare Effect of International Remittance
Income,” Ph.D. thesis, The University of New Mexico.
Niimi, Y., T. H. Pham, and B. Reilly (2008): “Determinants of re-
mittances : recent evidence using data on internal migrants in Vietnam,”
Policy Research Working Paper Series 4586, The World Bank.
Oliver, A. (2009): “Does poverty alleviation increase migration? evidence
from Mexico,” MPRA Paper 35076, University Library of Munich, Ger-
many.
Parajuli, D., G. Acharya, N. Chaudhury, and B. B. Thapa (2012):
“Impact of Social Fund on the Welfare of Rural Household: Evidence from
the Nepal Poverty Alleviation Fund,” Discussion paper, World Bank.
Portes, L. S. V. (2009): “Remittance, Poverty and Inequality,” Journal
of Economic Development, 34, 127–140.
Ratha, D., S. Mohapatra, and A. Silwal (2010): “Remittances to
developing countries will surpass 400 billion dollars in 2012,” Discussion
paper, The World Bank.
Rosenzweig, M. R., and O. Stark (1989): “Consumption Smoothing,
Migration, and Marriage: Evidence from Rural India,” Journal of Political
Economy, 97(4), pp. 905–926.
Rothenberg, T. (1973): Efficient estimation with a priori information.
Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics.
Sapkota, C. (2013): “Remittances in Nepal: Boon or Bane?,” Journal of
Development Studies, 49(10), 1316–1331.
Serino, M. N. V., and D. Kim (2011): “How Do International Remit-
tances Affect Poverty In Developing Countries? A Quantile Regression
Analysis,” Journal of Economic Development, 36(4), 17–40.
Sharma, K. (2006): “The political economy of civil war in Nepal,” World
Development, 34(7), 1237 – 1253.
Skoufias, E. (1994): “Using Shadow Wages to Estimate Labor Supply of
Agricultural Households,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
76(2), pp. 215–227.
124
Stecklov, G., P. Winters, M. Stampini, and B. Davis (2005): “Do
Conditional Cash Transfers Influence Migration? A Study Using Exper-
imental Data from the Mexican Progresa Program,” Demography, 42(4),
pp. 769–790.
The Ministry of Finance (2013): “Economic Survey FY 2012-2013,”
Discussion paper, Government of Nepal, Ministry of Finance.
(2014): “Economic Survey FY 2013-2014,” Discussion paper, Gov-
ernment of Nepal, Ministry of Finance.
The Poverty Alleviation Fund (2013): “Poverty Alleviation Fund An-
nual Progress Report 2012/2013,” Discussion paper, Poverty Alleviation
Fund, Nepal.
(2014): “Poverty Alleviation Fund, Nepal,” Discussion paper,
Poverty Alleviation Fund, Poverty Alleviation Fund, Nepal (PAF, Nepal),
Tahachal, Kathmandu, P.O.Box 9985, Kathmandu, Nepal.
The World Bank (2006): “Community-Driven Development in the Con-
text of Conflict-Affected Countries: Challenges and Opportunities,” Dis-
cussion paper, The World Bank.
Thieme, S., and S. Wyss (2005): “Migration Patterns and Remittance
Transfer in Nepal: A Case Study of Sainik Basti in Western Nepal,” In-
ternational Migration, 43(5), 59–98.
Vyas, S., and L. Kumaranayake (2006): “Constructing socio-economic
status indices: how to use principal components analysis,” Health Policy
and Planning, 21(6), 459–468.
Williams, N. E. (2013): “How community organizations moderate the
effect of armed conflict on migration in Nepal.,” Population Studies, 67(3),
353 – 369.
Wong, S. (2012): “What Have Been the Impacts of World Bank
Community-Driven Development Programs?,” Discussion paper, The
World Bank.
Wouterse, F. (2010): “Remittances, Poverty, Inequality and Welfare: Ev-
idence from the Central Plateau of Burkina Faso,” Journal of Development
Studies, 46(4), 771–789.
Yang, D. (2008): “International Migration, Remittances and Household
Investment: Evidence from Philippine Migrants’ Exchange Rate Shocks,”
Economic Journal, 118(528), 591–630.
125
